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ABSTRACT Questions of the effectiveness of economic policy reform are
inseparable from the political economy factors responsible for distortionary
policies in the ﬁrst place. Distortionary policies are more likely to be adopted
where politicians face fewer constraints. Hence reform should have modest
effects in societies where the political system already imposes strong con-
straints, and in societies with weak constraints, because it does not alter the
underlying political economy. Reform should be most effective in societies
with intermediate constraints. Furthermore, effective reform in one dimension
may lead to deterioration in others, as politicians address the underlying
demands through other means—a phenomenon we call the seesaw effect. We
report evidence that central bank reforms reduced inﬂation in countries with
intermediate constraints but had no or little effect where constraints were
strong or weak. We also present evidence consistent with the seesaw effect: in
countries where central bank reform reduces inﬂation, government expendi-
ture tends to increase.
I
nstitutional and policy reforms are often promoted as a way to improve
economic performance and growth in poor countries. Reforms that have
received substantial attention over the past decade or so include opening to
trade, ﬁnancial liberalization, judicial reform, privatization of state enter-
prises, reduction of entry barriers, tax reform, removal of targeted indus-
trial subsidies, and central bank independence. The list thus includes not
only those in the original Washington consensus,
1 but also a range of other
reforms.
1. Williamson (1990).
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11302-05_Acemoglu_rev.qxd  9/12/08  1:06 PM  Page 351Although there are sound economic theories suggesting why these
reforms might be important in improving economic performance, the expe-
rience of the last decade shows that such reforms rarely seem to have the
effects anticipated by their proponents. Nicolas van de Walle, for instance,
summarizes the ineffectiveness of reform in sub-Saharan Africa by noting
that “at the dawn of the twenty-ﬁrst century, most of sub-Saharan Africa
remains mired in economic crisis despite two decades of donor-sponsored
reform efforts....  Many if not most African countries are poorer today
than they were twenty years ago.”
2 Similarly, Andrés Velasco, the current
Chilean ﬁnance minister, articulates the widespread disillusion with the
impact of reform in Latin America:
Reformers argued, persuasively, that growth was being held back by distor-
tions. Many of the distortions were government induced, the result of poorly
conceived policies. Change policy and the economy will fulﬁll its poten-
tial....  A  decade later the view is less sanguine: with fewer bad-policy dis-
tortions, the Latin American economies grew in the 1990s at half the rate
attained during precisely those decades when the allegedly distorting poli-
cies of import substitution reached their peak: the 1960s and 1970s.
3
Why do seemingly sensible reforms fail to generate the beneﬁts they
promise? The critics of reform emphasize, among other things, the potential
negative effects of international trade on infant industries, the instabilities
that might be induced by ﬁnancial liberalization, and the usefulness of a
variety of regulations, government ownership, and industrial policy in less
developed economies.
4 Joseph Stiglitz, for example, argues that in many
cases “the economic policies that evolved into the Washington Consen-
sus and were introduced into developing countries were not appropriate for
countries in the early stages of development or . . . transition [from central
planning].”
5
This is not the only way to interpret the apparent failure of reform, how-
ever. In this paper we emphasize that to understand why reforms do or do
not work, it is necessary to investigate the political economy of distor-
tionary policies. Our general argument is that the analysis of whether and
which reforms will lead to improved economic performance should start
with an understanding of why distortionary policies were in place to start
with. We show that this perspective leads to some simple, testable ideas
352 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2008
2. Van de Walle (2001, pp. 3–4).
3. Velasco (2005, p. 2).
4. See Rodrik (2005).
5. Stiglitz (2002, p. 16).
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nary evidence consistent with these ideas.
6
Much of the economic literature on policy reform and most of the
advice given by international institutions assume, implicitly or explic-
itly, that distortionary policies came about by accident. Either these poli-
cies were put in place long ago and remain as a historical legacy, or they
are the outcome of some mistaken economic theory or shortsightedness
on the part of policymakers. But this perspective is limited at best.
Although one can undoubtedly find instances where mistaken economic
theories led to disastrous policies, few policymakers create hyperinfla-
tions or large budget deficits because they think these are good for the
economy.
What, then, might explain the presence of bad policies? The literature
on political economy suggests that bad policies arise because the prefer-
ences of politicians or others holding power are not aligned with those of
the rest of the society. The politically powerful may have an incentive to
distort policies or institutions so as to redistribute income or power to them-
selves.
7 Their ability to do so will depend on the constraints they face and,
more generally, on the structure of political institutions. A potent source of
policy failure is the absence of constraints on political ofﬁceholders, in the
form of checks and balances on their actions and means of holding them
accountable.
8 This perspective emphasizes that policy reform takes place
in an environment where existing policies serve political purposes, such as
redistributing resources to groups with power and inﬂuence. This implies
that those who expect to see their economic rents or privileges disappear
as a result of policy reform are likely to use their political power to prevent
its effective implementation.
Alternatively, political realities may make it impossible or impractical
for those entrusted with the implementation of reform to carry it out. This
implies a potentially large gap between de jure reform and de facto
reform. In particular, only those policy reforms that the politically power-
ful beneﬁciaries of the distortionary policies cannot easily override, cir-
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6. An alternative and complementary perspective is that reformers, aware of the political
constraints underlying policy decisions, may push for reforms and emphasize their eco-
nomic beneﬁts as part of a bargaining process among political groups and policymakers.
This perspective, although plausible, has not been developed in the literature and must also
ultimately model the political economy of reform.
7. See, for example, Acemoglu (2006).
8. See, for example, North and Weingast (1989), Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997),
Henisz (2000), and Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005).
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these groups can thwart reform depends in turn on the constraints on
politicians and on the policymaking process. This argument suggests that
in societies such as many in sub-Saharan Africa, where politicians and
politically powerful groups face only a few constraints on their power,
policy reform is unlikely to be very effective. This is consistent with the
case study evidence and argument presented by van de Walle,
9 who illus-
trates that for African politicians, “restoring economic stability and
growth has often taken a back seat in government motivations to preserv-
ing political power.”
10 In the context of structural adjustment, van de
Walle argues,
Often, the policies have changed on paper, but in practice, something
resembling the status quo ante continues to prevail. In some cases, the old
policies were reinstated under a new name or with some new policy objec-
tive....  I n  other cases, governments ignore the spirit of their own liberal-
ization efforts by continuing to interfere in ofﬁcially deregulated markets.
11
Under these circumstances, the ineffectiveness of reform is not surpris-
ing; few people would expect privatization, ﬁnancial liberalization, or cen-
tral bank independence (CBI) to have fundamental effects in Zimbabwe as
long as Robert Mugabe is in power, for example, or in Sudan as long as
Omar al-Bashir’s kleptocratic and genocidal regime remains in place. To
illustrate, figure 1 plots the inflation rate in Zimbabwe; the vertical line
at 1995 indicates when the Central Bank Act was modiﬁed to grant the
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe greater independence.
12 Clearly, increased CBI
did little to restrain Zimbabwe’s subsequent monetary policy. This some-
what extreme example illustrates that a major reason why policy reform
often fails is the absence of a functioning system of accountability and a
lack of constraints and checks on politicians.
13
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9. Van de Walle (1993, 2001).
10. Van de Walle (2001, p. 13).
11. Van de Walle (2001, p. 76).
12. The 1995 Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Act legislated a greater degree of autonomy
for the central bank. After 1995 the bank had its own budget and could decide on its own
ﬁnances. The act also established the control of inﬂation as the unique objective of monetary
policy.
13. This example and our results below raise the question of why potentially ineffective
reforms are implemented in the ﬁrst place. One obvious answer is that they are partly a
response to external pressures. For example, Jácome (2001) documents how an International
Monetary Fund technical assistance mission to Zimbabwe exerted pressure for the reform of
central bank laws in 1995. This perspective suggests that externally imposed policy reforms
might be less successful and effective than those generated by internal dynamics.
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increase the impact of reforms? Not necessarily. Policy reform has its
greatest potential effect when the prereform policies are highly distor-
tionary. However, one would not expect a society with a functioning
system of accountability and with checks on politicians to be pursuing
highly distortionary policies in the first place. For example, inflation
was already low in the United Kingdom in the 1990s, before the Bank of
England became independent in 1998.
14 Thus room for a large effect
from CBI was limited. Rather, high inflation or even hyperinflation is
much more likely in societies with weak institutions than in those where
politicians are accountable, through elections or other means, to the
population at large.
These arguments suggest that from a political economy perspective,
policy reform should not be expected to be equally effective in every soci-
ety; rather, the functioning and success of reform should depend on political
institutions and political constraints. More speciﬁcally, these arguments
suggest a potentially nonmonotonic relationship between the extent of
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14. Inﬂation increased in the United Kingdom in the 1970s and early 1980s but never
approached hyperinﬂationary levels. The desire to avoid a return of such episodes, as well as
to realize the other beneﬁts of CBI, such as greater credibility and transparency of monetary
policy, might be among the reasons why countries with relatively good policies still prefer to
implement central bank reform.
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics; Polillo and Guillén (2005).
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Figure 1. Inﬂation in Zimbabwe before and after Central Bank Independence,
1965–2007
11302-05_Acemoglu_rev.qxd  9/12/08  1:06 PM  Page 355constraints on politicians and the effectiveness of reform. The importance
of political economy factors in understanding and evaluating the success
of policy reform is this paper’s main message.
We develop this perspective by investigating, both theoretically and
empirically, the interplay between policy reform and institutional con-
straints on politicians. We ﬁrst delineate the main issues using a simple
theoretical model that illustrates how the relationship between constraints
on power and the impact of reforms could be nonmonotonic. The model
also highlights how effective reform may sometimes lead to the deteriora-
tion of other, unreformed policies—a phenomenon that in previous work
we have called the seesaw effect.
15
We then investigate the validity of these ideas by focusing on reforms
related to central bank independence. CBI is a natural type of reform for
us to study. Most other reforms, such as financial liberalization, judicial
reform, or removal of targeted subsidies, have relatively broad mandates
and try to improve, among other things, the overall functioning of the
economy, investment, and growth. CBI, in contrast, has a much more
clearly delineated target: inflation. We can thus judge the success of CBI
by whether or not it has reduced inflation. Nevertheless, even this inves-
tigation is complicated by the fact that countries often introduce CBI not
as a stand-alone policy reform, but as part of a broader anti-inflation
package.
16 In such cases, therefore, we interpret the regression evidence
on the implications of CBI as corresponding to the effects of this broad
package.
Our main empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis of a non-
monotonic relationship between political constraints and the effectiveness
of policy reform. We create an index of the quality of general institutions
by using constraints on the executive from Polity IV data. Although the
highly serially correlated nature of data on inﬂation makes statistical infer-
ence difﬁcult, the evidence is broadly consistent with a pattern in which
CBI reduced inﬂation in countries with intermediate levels of constraints
on the executive but appears to have had no effect in countries with the
strongest institutions. For countries with the weakest institutions, the gen-
eral pattern is likewise one of no effect, although some speciﬁcations show
356 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2008
15. Acemoglu and others (2003).
16. A clear example is Argentina, where, shortly before the introduction of CBI in 1992,
a currency board was established to peg the exchange rate to the dollar. Figure B2 in appen-
dix B also shows that, in a number of countries, inﬂation begins to decline a few years before
the introduction of CBI.
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empirical results reject the hypothesis that the effect of CBI is the same in
countries with strong as in those with medium constraints, but we are gen-
erally unable to reject the hypothesis that the effect is the same in countries
with medium and weak constraints.
Overall, our approach and empirical results suggest that reform of eco-
nomic institutions will be effective only if the political context is right. If
the context already provides political constraints and accountability mech-
anisms that produce a strong tendency to adopt good policies, there will be
little room for reform to have major effects. If the context is poor, so that
politics and policymaking are highly nonrepresentative, reform is likely to
be irrelevant, because it can easily be undermined. It is in the intermediate
situations that reform may have some bite: constraints in such cases are
weak enough to generate bad policy, but not so weak that all reform can be
undermined.
In this light, our ﬁndings point to a different interpretation of the appar-
ent failure of the various reforms implemented throughout the 1990s and
early 2000s than those argued by either the skeptics or the advocates of
reform. First, contrary to the skeptics, it is not true that all reforms have
failed. In the case of CBI, the empirical focus in this paper, it appears that
policy reform is associated with a signiﬁcant decline in inﬂation in societies
with intermediate (and sometimes those with weak) constraints on politi-
cians. Second, our results suggest that even in countries where reform has
failed, it has not done so because it was inappropriate from an economic
point of view. Rather, potentially sound economic reform may often be
politically nonviable in certain societies, at least if it does not take into
account the political context.
Nevertheless, we emphasize that all of the evidence provided in this
paper corresponds to the conditional correlations in the data consistent
with declines in inflation at the same time as or following central bank-
ing reform (and not to the causal effect of CBI on inflation). As we
stress further below, policy reform in general and central bank reform in
particular are endogenous, determined as part of the political economy
equilibrium in the society. Consequently, one should be cautious about
reaching strong conclusions on the basis of such evidence. Having said
that, the fact that CBI is correlated with contemporaneous and future
declines in inflation mostly in societies with intermediate levels of con-
straints on politicians is intriguing and, at the very least, requires further
investigation.
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there is any evidence of a seesaw effect following CBI. The seesaw effect
suggests that when successful policy reform takes place in one dimension
and the political equilibrium remains largely unchanged, politicians may try
to use a different instrument to attain the goal previously targeted with the
instrument now being reformed. In general, the seesaw effect implies that
as policy gets better in one dimension, it may get worse in another. A nat-
ural candidate for the seesaw effect in the context of CBI is ﬁscal policy.
We therefore investigate whether or not ﬁscal policy changes signiﬁcantly
after CBI is introduced. We provide some evidence that CBI is associated
with greater government expenditure as a percentage of GDP in countries
with intermediate constraints, and unrelated to government expenditure in
countries with weak or strong constraints. This evidence is consistent with
some worsening in other dimensions of policy in countries where CBI
reform has been effective in reducing inﬂation, although the effect of CBI
on government expenditure is less robust than its impact on inﬂation.
The recent economic history of Colombia and Argentina, depicted in ﬁg-
ure 2, illustrates the seesaw effect. In both countries the introduction of CBI
in 1991 was followed by both a signiﬁcant fall in inﬂation and an increase
in government expenditure as a percentage of GDP. In the Argentinean
case, as in many other countries in our sample, inﬂation started falling before
the central bank reform, which, as mentioned above, suggests that CBI is
part of a broader package of reforms aimed at controlling and stabilizing
inﬂation.
In Colombia it is widely alleged that, in the mid-1990s, President
Ernesto Samper engaged in extensive clientelism in an effort to remain in
power following the revelation that he had received large amounts of
money from the Cali drug cartel.
17 The situation somewhat resembled that
in the 1970s, when President Misael Pastrana used clientelism to broaden
his political support following a disputed election.
18 But Pastrana was
able to direct the central bank, which was not then independent, to give
easy credit to various ﬁrms and sectors; this, in combination with
increased expenditure ﬁnanced by seigniorage, caused inﬂation to accel-
erate.
19 Samper, in contrast, came to power after the central bank had
become independent. As a consequence, he had to rely more heavily on
increasing expenditure, largely in the form of wage increases for public
358 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2008
17. See, for example, Sierra Montoya (2004).
18. Jaramillo, Steiner, and Salazar (1997).
19. Cabrera Galvis and Ocampo (1980, p. 136).
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Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook;
Jácome and Vásquez (2005).
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Figure 2. The Seesaw Effect in Colombia and Argentina
employees and increased military spending.20 The central bank largely
offset the inﬂationary effects of this expansionary ﬁscal policy with con-
tractionary monetary policy.
21
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section dis-
cusses the relevant literature on the political economy of reform, on the
20. Echeverry (2002); Davila Ladron de Guevara and others (2000).
21. Reyes and others (1998).
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institutional factors and the effectiveness of policies. The following sec-
tion presents a simple model illustrating why policy reform may be most
influential in societies with intermediate levels of political constraints.
We also use this model to show how policy reform in one sphere can
lead to a deterioration of other dimensions of policy, creating a seesaw
effect. The next section discusses our data sources and the construction
of the CBI variable. The next presents our main empirical results, which
suggest that, consistent with our theoretical expectations, CBI has little
effect on inflation in societies with the strongest and the weakest con-
straints on politicians, but tends to reduce inflation in countries with
intermediate levels of constraints. The penultimate section investigates
the seesaw effect, looking for evidence, in societies where CBI has
reduced inflation, of deterioration in other policies. The final section
concludes.
Related Literature
Our paper is related to two broad areas of research, one on the political
economy of reform in general and the other on the consequences of central
bank independence. We now give a brief overview of these literatures and
how our ﬁndings add to them.
Political Economy of Reform
A great deal of theoretical and case study work examines the political
economy of reform.
22 Most of the theoretical research focuses on devel-
oping explanations for why socially beneﬁcial reforms do not occur or are
delayed.
23 Sharun Mukand and Dani Rodrik, however, develop a model in
which policymakers adopt reforms they know to be inefﬁcient in order to
avoid being thought corrupt.
24 Other work, taking political impediments
to reform as given, discusses their implications for the sequencing of
reforms, whether or not gradual or radical reform is desirable, and
whether or not reform can be sustained.
25 Most closely related to our
paper are those by Maxim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny,
26
who examine the circumstances under which privatization increases efﬁ-
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22. See Rodrik (1996) and Drazen (2000) for overviews.
23. See, for example, Alesina and Drazen (1991) and Fernandez and Rodrik (1991).
24. Mukand and Rodrik (2005).
25. For example, Dewatripont and Roland (1997).
26. Shleifer and Vishny (1994); Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996).
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employment, and even though the managers of a privatized ﬁrm may
maximize proﬁts with less employment, politicians can bribe them to
employ more people. The same authors also study the circumstances
under which employment falls after privatization. Stephen Coate and
Stephen Morris, formalizing an intuition of George Stigler,
27 develop a
model in which policy reform can reduce efﬁciency when politicians are
initially using policy instruments to redistribute income in an optimal
way. A key difference between our approach and Coate and Morris’s is
our emphasis on the role of political institutions. None of the papers men-
tioned above derive the nonmonotonic relationship between reform and
outcomes that is at the heart of our model.
At a general level, the entire empirical literature on the impact of policy
and policy reform on economic variables—for example, on economic
growth—provides relevant and useful background to our work. That policy
reform might be desirable is implied from regressions showing that variation
in policies can account for variation in economic growth. Although certainly
some papers argue this, the cross-country literature is far from a consensus.
28
For instance, because policy variables exhibit multicollinearity, it is gener-
ally difﬁcult to ﬁnd robust relationships between particular policy measures
and growth. Moreover, the empirical analysis in most of these papers is
based on cross-sectional regressions, so that omitted-variable bias may be a
signiﬁcant concern.
29
Most of the empirical work on reform focuses on speciﬁc instances of
either failed or successful reforms.
30 Among cross-national empirical stud-
ies, David Dollar and Jakob Svensson show that political factors, particu-
larly whether or not a country has a democratic government and how long
the government has been in power, are important for the success of World
Bank programs.
31 In the related context of the effectiveness of international
aid, Craig Burnside and Dollar offer evidence that aid increases growth
when combined with good institutions and policies,
32 although William
Easterly, Ross Levine, and David Roodman show that their results may not
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27. Coate and Morris (2006); Stigler (1971, 1972).
28. See Easterly (2005) for a review.
29. There is also convincing microeconomic evidence that some speciﬁc types of
reforms, such as privatization, can have large beneﬁcial effects. See, for example, La Porta
and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999) and Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky (2005).
30. For example, Bates and Krueger (1993).
31. Dollar and Svensson (2000).
32. Burnside and Dollar (2000).
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the institutional environment has also appeared in other empirical papers.
For instance, Geert Bekaert, Campbell Harvey, and Christian Lundblad,
and Halvar Mehlum, Karl-Ove Moene, and Ragnar Torvik, show that the
effect of natural resource abundance on economic growth depends on the
quality of institutions in the society.
34
Our research is also related to the case study literature on Latin Ameri-
can politics, which has argued that the appearance and the reality of policy
reform in Latin America may be very different. Several scholars have argued
that the adoption of Washington consensus reforms in Latin America was
accompanied by the continuation of populist policies and politics as usual.
35
The adoption of these reforms did constrain which policies could be used,
but politicians such as Carlos Menem in Argentina and Alberto Fujimori in
Peru realized that even policy reform could be adjusted to the demands of
clientelism: for example, government-owned ﬁrms could be privatized but
sold relatively cheaply to those with political connections. Populism and
clientelism persisted even though the instruments that they used changed,
an argument clearly related to those we make in this paper.
Central Bank Independence and Inﬂation
One of the most studied types of policy reform is the introduction of CBI.
Theoretical work in the early 1980s argued that when unanticipated changes
in monetary policy can reduce the rate of unemployment, the government
will be unable to commit to low inﬂation, and consequently inﬂation will be
suboptimally high.
36 Kenneth Rogoff’s proposed solution to this problem,
namely, to delegate monetary policy to a conservative central banker, estab-
lished a theoretical rationale for creating independent central banks.
37
A large number of empirical studies over the past ﬁfteen years have
examined the impact of CBI on inﬂation, economic growth, and a variety
of other variables.
38 Some early studies used a measure of de jure CBI
(we describe the construction of the various measures of CBI below) and
exploited cross-sectional variation within OECD countries.
39 Alberto
362 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2008
33. Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (2004).
34. Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005); Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006).
35. Notably, Roberts (1995, 2008), Gibson (1997), and Levitsky (2003).
36. Most notable in this literature is Barro and Gordon (1983).
37. Rogoff (1985).
38. See Eijfﬁnger and de Haan (1996) for an overview.
39. Alesina (1988); Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991); Alesina and Summers
(1993).
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between inﬂation and de jure CBI.
40
This de jure index of CBI was further developed by Alex Cukierman,
Steven Webb, and Bilin Neyapti and extended to seventy-two indepen-
dent countries over the period 1950–89.
41 Using their index in pooled
time-series and cross-sectional regressions, that study and another by
Cukierman show that the negative correlation between de jure CBI and
inflation does not hold for a cross section of developing countries,
although they confirm the earlier negative correlation for developed
countries.
42 They also show that their index of de facto CBI (based on
the turnover of central bank governors) is negatively correlated with
inflation in developing countries, but not significantly correlated with
inflation in developed countries.
43
Nevertheless, other studies ﬁnd very different results. Using updated
data, Christopher Crowe and Ellen Meade do not ﬁnd the same correla-
tions.
44 Marta Campillo and Jeffrey Miron argue, as does Thomas Oatley,
that the correlation between de jure CBI and inﬂation is not robust to the
inclusion of various covariates, such as measures of openness or the gov-
ernment deﬁcit.
45 Oatley, Gabriel Mangano, James Forder, and King Bana-
ian, Richard Burdekin, and Thomas Willett also document that the results
depend on the subjectively coded details of CBI measures and are not gen-
erally robust.
46
Philip Keefer and David Stasavage,47 in work related to this paper, argue
that CBI will be effective only if it cannot be reversed, and that this will
happen only if there are political checks and balances. In their empirical
work they interact a measure of checks and balances from Thorsten Beck
and coauthors with CBI and ﬁnd that introducing CBI increases inﬂation
unless checks and balances are sufﬁciently strong.
48 Their work, like much
of the rest of this literature, exploits only cross-sectional variation. This
strategy makes omitted-variable bias potentially quite severe, since the
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40. Alesina and Summers (1993, p. 154)
41. Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992).
42. Cukierman (1992).
43. Various other papers, such as Gutiérrez (2003) and Arnone and others (2007), report
similar results.
44. Crowe and Meade (2007).
45. Campillo and Miron (1997); Oatley (1999).
46. Oatley (1999); Mangano (1998); Forder (1998); Banaian, Burdekin, and Willett
(1998).
47. Keefer and Stasavage (2002, 2003).
48. Beck and others (2001).
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equilibria than the rest.
In contrast to almost all of this literature, we focus on within-country
variation. Although not a panacea against omitted-variable bias, ﬁxed-
effects panel data regressions provide more convincing and more relevant
conditional correlations, focusing on whether inﬂation declines following
the introduction of CBI. Using such regressions, we will show that the
introduction of CBI appears to be associated with declines in inﬂation in
countries with intermediate political constraints. The beneﬁts of CBI in
more developed economies appear to be more limited.
49
The Motivating Theory
In this section we use a simple model to clarify our approach to the politi-
cal economy of reform, and we derive hypotheses concerning the circum-
stances under which CBI should have a signiﬁcant impact on inﬂation. Our
purpose is not to contribute to the theoretical literature on the political econ-
omy of reform, but rather to highlight why speciﬁc institutional reforms
might have different effects depending on the constraints facing politicians.
For this purpose we choose the simplest model possible to communicate the
major forces rather than strive for generality. Our model is a simpliﬁed ver-
sion of—and a slight variant on—Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman’s
model of lobbying.
50 In this model a single organized lobby tries to con-
vince a politician to choose distortionary policies, but underlying con-
straints and reform of speciﬁc institutions relating to this policy place limits
on the lobby’s inﬂuence on the politician and on policy choices. We ﬁrst
use this model to highlight the interactions between policy reform and con-
straints on politicians. We then use a simple extension of the model to show
how successful policy reform in one sphere can lead to a deterioration in
other dimensions of policy (the seesaw effect).
Our framework is chosen both for its simplicity and to emphasize the
commonalities between CBI and other types of policy reform; it does not
do justice to some aspects of the macroeconomic equilibrium leading to
high inﬂation. For example, the time-inconsistency problems emphasized
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49. This does not imply that CBI has no beneﬁt in relatively developed countries. Given
the lower inﬂation observed in OECD economies, the effect of CBI will be harder to detect,
particularly if it is small. Moreover, CBI might create other beneﬁts by introducing trans-
parency and creating insurance against possible future relaxations of monetary policy.
50. Grossman and Helpman (1994).
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vide some justiﬁcation for why we think these time-inconsistency problems
are not ﬁrst-order in the context of high inﬂation in developing countries.
The war-of-attrition aspect of the conﬂict over policy reform, emphasized
by Alesina and Allan Drazen, is also absent in our setup.
52 Although one
could develop the same general insights using a war-of-attrition model, we
prefer to use our simpler model to highlight the basic political economy
factors affecting the effectiveness of policy reforms.
Model and Main Result
The economy consists of three actors: the citizenry, a politician, and an
organized interest group or lobby. There is a single policy variable π≥0. To
make the transition to the empirical work easier, this policy can be thought
of as inﬂation policy, although nothing in this section depends on this inter-
pretation. In addition to policy π, the variable ρ∈{0, ρR}, with ρR > 0,
denotes whether or not there has been policy reform (ρ=0 if there has not)
and parameterizes its intensity (see below). The large group of citizens has
preferences given by
where η is a strictly positive constant. These preferences imply that the
political bliss point of the citizens (that is, their most preferred policy) is
π=0 (since π≥0 by assumption), and any increase in π away from zero
reduces citizens’ welfare. Thus π should be thought of throughout as a
distortionary policy. We could also make u directly depend on whether
there has been policy reform, that is, on ρ. This has no effect on the major
results we would like to emphasize. In addition, u is made linear in π only
to simplify the exposition.
The second actor, the politician, has a utility function given by
Here t ≥ 0 denotes a transfer from the lobby, which might consist of
explicit bribes or campaign contributions. The variable λ∈[0, 1] captures
how much weight the politician’s utility function places on the welfare of
the citizens. We think of λ as a measure of general institutional constraints
on the politician (such as those measured, in our empirical work, by con-
() ,, . 21 vtu t πρ λ π λ ρ π ( ) = ( ) +− ( ) −
() , 1 u πη π ( ) =−
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51. Barro and Gordon (1983); Rogoff (1985).
52. Alesina and Drazen (1991).
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cian must act as a perfect agent of the citizens, perhaps because any devi-
ation from the policies preferred by the citizens will be punished by
quick replacement. In contrast, when λ is close to zero, there are few
constraints on the politician’s behavior, perhaps because he or she is not
accountable to the citizens or because politicians are difﬁcult to replace
using elections or other means. In this case the politician can pursue with
impunity policies that increase the transfers he or she receives.
The other important feature of the preferences in equation 2 is the depen-
dence on ρπ. This captures the idea that policy reform makes distortionary
policies more costly for the politician. For example, the politician may ﬁnd
it more difﬁcult to provide credit to favored ﬁrms or groups, or to enact
inﬂationary policies aimed at winning support. All else equal, this will dis-
courage the use of distortionary policies by the politician. Making the use
of such policies more costly for the politician is not the only way to model
the effects of policy reform.
54 An alternative would be to model policy
reform as introducing a hard constraint, for example imposing π≤π – for
some upper bound on policy π –. This is not a useful modeling strategy for
understanding policy reform in societies with weak institutions, however,
because such hard constraints would leave no room for pursuing distor-
tionary policies after the reform, whereas our focus is on whether reform
will prevent politicians from choosing distortionary policies.
The third actor is an organized lobby, which beneﬁts from π. Suppose
that the utility of the lobby is given by
where α and β are strictly positive constants. The quadratic form is again
assumed for convenience, as is the speciﬁcation that these preferences do
() , , 3
2
2 wt t πα π
β
π ( ) =− −
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53. In a richer model, strong constraints might make lobbies more powerful, because a
well-meaning politician might be unable to act decisively to reduce inﬂation. However, we
believe that this consideration is second-order because well-meaning politicians are rela-
tively rare.
54. Yet another alternative, which in fact gives even more stark results, is to assume that
these reforms act as costly commitment devices, and thus that they make distortionary poli-
cies more costly for the citizens. In this case policy reform would discourage distortionary
policies by increasing the costs that these policies impose on the society, and indirectly on
the politician. In the context of CBI, for example, high inﬂation becomes both more costly to
society and potentially more costly to implement for the government, both because it will
destroy the beneﬁcial reputation that monetary policy may have established and because
workers’ and ﬁrms’ behavior would have been shaped by expectations of low inﬂation. The
assumption adopted in the text may have wider applicability, motivating our choice here.
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qualitative results. These preferences immediately imply that the lobby’s
political bliss point is
and so the lobby will try, using the only instrument available to it for this
purpose, the transfer t, to shift policy toward higher levels of π than pre-
ferred by the citizens. Examples of policies for which citizens and lobbies
have conﬂicting preferences include industrial policy, tariffs, and agricul-
tural subsidies. Inﬂation is another potential example, since it is often used
as a means of generating funds (for example, through the inﬂation tax) for
redistribution to politically powerful groups, such as public sector employ-
ees or companies receiving procurements or industrial subsidies, at the
expense of the citizens at large; inﬂation may also result from the use of
government credits for favored ﬁrms.
Although there are three actors in all, the citizens are passive, and the
main interactions are between the lobby and the politician. We model this
game as follows:
—The parameter λ and the reform variable ρ are given.
—The lobby makes an offer (π ˆ, t ˆ) to the politician. As in Grossman
and Helpman’s model, this implies that if the politician accepts the trans-
fer t ˆ, he or she has to implement policy π ˆ. This is presumably supported
by a continuation game with repeated interactions, but as in much of the
literature, to simplify the analysis we do not model these.
—The politician chooses policy π ~. If π ~ =π ˆ, the politician also receives
transfer t ˆ. Otherwise, the politician receives t = 0.
This is a simple game, and we characterize its subgame perfect equilib-
rium, as is usually done, by backward induction. In the last stage of the
game, the politician will choose whichever policy maximizes his or her
utility. Clearly, this will be either π ~ =π ˆ, so that the politician receives the
transfer t ˆ, obtaining a utility λu(π ˆ) + (1 −λ )t ˆ −ρ π ˆ, or π ~ = 0, in which case
the politician receives zero transfers and obtains utility λu(0).
Therefore we can summarize the best response of the politician as
follows:
55
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55. To simplify the notation, this expression already imposes the choice that will prevail
in equilibrium when the politician is indifferent.
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must satisfy this incentive compatibility constraint (or respect the fact that
the politician will play a best response in the last stage). This implies that
when the lobby wishes to see implemented a policy close to its own pref-
erences, it must choose (π ˆ, t ˆ) as a solution to the following program:
Let the solution to this maximization problem give the lobby utilityw ˆ.
Since (π ˆ = 0, t ˆ = 0) is a feasible strategy, we must have w ˆ ≥ 0. Moreover,
it is also evident that this problem will lead to a solution with w ˆ > 0, when
π ˆ > 0, and t ˆ > 0 will be chosen if and only if the solution to expression 
5 also involves π ˆ > 0.
We next characterize the solution to this problem. The incentive compa-
tibility constraint of the politician (equation 4) requires that if π ˆ > 0, then
Substituting this into the objective function of the lobby (equation 3), we
have the problem faced by the lobby expressed as
whenever it wants to implement policy π ˆ > 0. Inspection of this maximiza-
tion problem establishes our ﬁrst result:
Result 1. If λ≥λ
–
≡α /(α+η ), then the lobby prefers not to have an
inﬂuence on policy regardless of whether ρ=0 or ρ=ρ R.
This result follows immediately, since when λ≥λ
–
, the utility-maximizing
policy for the lobby is to choose π ˆ = 0. Since λ corresponds to a measure of
the quality of constraints on the politician, this result suggests that when
these constraints are sufﬁciently strong, the political system will generate a
policy choice that is not distortionary, regardless of whether there has been
reform or not. In terms of our empirical work below, this result suggests that
in societies that place signiﬁcant constraints on politicians, reform should
have relatively small effects. This can be understood by considering the
example of inﬂation: although CBI might limit inﬂation in well-governed
societies, one would not expect a very large decline in inﬂation to result from
implementing CBI, since these societies would not have chosen highly dis-
tortionary policies to start with.
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expression 6, and thus the (subgame perfect) equilibrium level of policy, is
given by
This equation shows that the sensitivity of equilibrium policy π ~ to ρ (pol-
icy reform) will be lower, the lower is λ. Intuitively, when there are no
checks on the politician in power, the politician will do whatever maxi-
mizes his or her utility, and this will involve maximizing the transfers the
politician receives. Consequently, transfers can outweigh the costs that
policy reform imposes on the politician’s use of distortionary policies. In
terms of the inﬂation example, the politician in power can exert pressure
or use other means to force the central bank to increase the money supply
and inﬂation, even if choosing high inﬂation might have become more
difﬁcult or costly.
56 Interpreted differently, equation 7 suggests that in
societies with low λ, de jure reform may not translate into de facto
reform, because despite the greater cost of π to the politician, the political
equilibrium will induce him or her to choose policies not so different from
those before the reform.
The following result now readily follows from equation 7:
Result 2. Suppose that λ < λ
–
. Then a reform that increases ρ from 0 to
ρR will reduce π ~. Moreover, for , the greater is λ, the greater
the decline following policy reform.
This result therefore implies that when constraints are not so strong as to
have avoided the use of distortionary policies in the first place, policy
reform might be effective. How effective it will be is a function of the
constraints on the politician. The greater is λ, the more transfers are nec-
essary for the politician to adopt the distortionary policy after reform,
and thus the lower will be the equilibrium distortionary policies follow-
ing reform.
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56. This will also be true when inﬂation or other distortionary policies also become
more costly for the society as a whole after reform. For example, inﬂation might be disas-
trous for the future of the economy and ruin the potential beneﬁts that might have resulted
from credibly establishing CBI (this can be incorporated by including ρπ in the utility func-
tion of the citizens), but when λ is low, this still will not deter politicians from using distor-
tionary policies.
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Result 3. Policy reform will have the largest effect on distortionary
policies in societies with intermediate levels of constraints on politi-
cians, and it will have no or only limited effects in societies with the
strongest and the weakest constraints.
In the empirical work that follows, we investigate whether the effects of
CBI reform on inﬂation are consistent with the predictions in Result 3.
The Seesaw Effect
We now use the model from the previous subsection to illustrate the
seesaw effect, whereby successful policy reform might lead to a deteriora-
tion in other dimensions of policy. To do this, we augment the previous
model with another policy dimension, denoted by θ≥0, and modify citi-
zen preferences to
where η′ is also a strictly positive constant. This implies that θ is another
distortionary policy, and thus the political bliss point of the citizens now
corresponds to π=θ=0. In this instance policy reform is narrowly tar-
geted at π and thus only makes policy π more costly for the politician.
Some reforms, which involve the introduction of greater accountability for
politicians, would not ﬁt this pattern. CBI reform is a natural candidate in
this context, since it is primarily focused on monetary policy and inﬂation.
The preferences of the lobby are modiﬁed to
with again α′ > 0. The preferences of the politician are unchanged. We
again look for a subgame perfect equilibrium.
The politician will choose π ˆ and θ ˆ greater than zero if
By reasoning identical to that in the previous subsection, the optimal
policy-transfer combination for the lobby is then given by the solution to
the following maximization problem:
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This assumption implies that policy θ is more costly for the citizens and
less beneﬁcial for the lobby than policy π. In view of this, the following
result is immediate:
Result 4. Suppose expression 9 holds and there has been no policy
reform; that is, ρ=0. Then θ
~
= 0.
Intuitively, it is more economical for the lobby to receive policy favors
through π, which is both more beneﬁcial for the lobby and less costly for
the citizens. Consequently, policy θ will never be used in equilibrium
(either π > 0 and θ=0, or π=θ=0). Result 4 is a consequence of the sim-
plifying assumptions made in this subsection; in particular, it depends on
the assumption that the two policies, π and θ, are perfect substitutes. With-
out this assumption, both policies might be used simultaneously before
policy reform. Nevertheless, our main result, Result 5 below, would con-
tinue to apply even when these policies are not perfect substitutes.
Next suppose that policy reform is enacted, so that ρ=ρ R > 0. Our main
result in this subsection is that following such policy reform, it may
become beneﬁcial to use the alternative distortionary policy θ. The follow-
ing result summarizes the conditions under which this will happen:
Result 5. Suppose expression 9 holds and consider policy reform
increasing ρ from 0 to ρR. If
then the equilibrium following policy reform involves π ~′=0 and
This result follows readily from the maximization problem in expression 8,
combined with expressions 9 and 10. Note that those two expressions are
consistent with each other provided that ρR is sufﬁciently large—meaning
that reform is effective in making policy π costly. Result 4 implies that
before policy reform, the equilibrium involves θ
~
= 0. Moreover, given
′ = ′ −
′
−
⎛
⎝ ⎜
⎞
⎠ ⎟ > θ
β
α
λη
λ
1
1
0.
() ,
,
10
11
α
λη ρ
λ
α
λη
λ
λλ
α
αη
−
+
−
< ′ −
′
−
<
′
′ + ′
and if
 
() 9 ′ > ′ < ηη αα and
ACEMOGLU, JOHNSON, QUERUBÍN, and ROBINSON 371
11302-05_Acemoglu_rev.qxd  9/12/08  1:06 PM  Page 371expressions 9 and 10, before policy reform the equilibrium involves π ~ > 0.
Consequently, policy reform in this case creates a typical seesaw pattern:
the policy that is regulated with the reform is used less intensively (moving
from π ~ > 0 to π ~′=0), but at the same time the political process generates
rents for the still-powerful lobby by using an alternative policy instrument
more intensively (moving from θ
~
= 0 to θ
~
′ > 0). This result highlights that
when the political-economic interactions leading to distortionary policies
remain unchanged, the imposition of a (speciﬁc or narrowly targeted) pol-
icy reform might change only the form of redistribution toward politically
powerful groups, rather than eliminate policy distortions entirely.
An interesting implication of the speciﬁc conﬁguration of parameters
given by expressions 9 and 10 should also be noted: in the case discussed
in Result 5, policy reform makes both citizens and the lobby worse off.
Instead of redistribution being accomplished through the less costly instru-
ment, it now uses the more costly instrument. This is not a general result:
policy reform might improve the allocation of resources despite the pres-
ence of seesaw-like effects. Nevertheless, this result points out the poten-
tial pitfalls of speciﬁc policy reforms in societies where constraints on
politicians are absent and political-economic interactions lead to dysfunc-
tional policy choices.
Discussion
The model we have developed here is in the spirit of standard approaches
to redistributive politics. In particular, as noted above, it does not include any
element of time inconsistency. We do not believe that time-inconsistency
issues play a major role in understanding high-inﬂation or hyperinﬂationary
episodes in less developed economies. Most instances of high inﬂation are
instead directly related to the inability of governments to fund their (often
politically motivated) expenditure through taxation and borrowing. Such
policies are much more likely to emerge when there is severe distributional
conﬂict that the political system is unable to resolve, or when politicians
have only limited instruments to use to distribute patronage. The increas-
ing inﬂation in Zimbabwe, depicted in ﬁgure 1, is an example: President
Mugabe turned to hyperinﬂation when he had no further resources left to
redistribute as patronage to the military and to his key supporters.
Finally, although we have followed Grossman and Helpman in setting up
the model with lobbies making offers to politicians,
57 the model could be
reformulated to allow politicians to make offers to lobbies or interest groups
372 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2008
57. Grossman and Helpman (1994).
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with the political experiences of countries in sub-Saharan Africa or Latin
America, where interest groups are as likely to be captured by politicians as
vice versa.
58 For instance, in his seminal study of economic policy in Ghana,
Tony Killick notes that President Kwame Nkrumah succeeded in capturing
the lobbies, making them dependent on him instead of himself on them.
59
Argentina under Juan Perón illustrates the same pattern.
60 First as minister
of labor and then as president in the 1940s, Perón played an active role in
creating the interest groups that then constituted his support base. Certain
groups in society will have (political) resources that politicians need, and
politicians will offer them redistribution in exchange for this support. The
model above could be reformulated along these lines, so that policy reform
would represent an increase in the cost to politicians of supplying policy
favors to interest groups, possibly because they now have to use patronage
to control those who run the independent central bank as well. Our major
results, in particular Results 3 and 5, would continue to apply in this modi-
ﬁed setup.
Data Sources and Construction
Throughout the paper we focus on the post–Bretton Woods period
1972–2005. From 1946 until 1971, when the United States suspended the
convertibility of dollars to gold, countries under the Bretton Woods system
agreed to coordinate monetary policy in order to ﬁx their currencies with
respect to gold. This naturally limited the discretion that both governments
and central banks enjoyed in managing their monetary policies. This
implies that the post–Bretton Woods era is a natural period for us to focus
on in analyzing the relationship between CBI and inﬂation.
Several approaches have been used to measure CBI, and some con-
troversy surrounds the advantages and disadvantages of each.
61 The key
question centers around whether one should use de jure measures,
which capture how much independence the central bank has under the
law, or de facto measures, which correspond to how much independence
the central bank has in practice. Another distinction that has been made
is between goal independence, in which the central bank is able to deter-
mine its own objectives, and operational independence, in which it does
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58. See Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier (2004) for a discussion.
59. Killick (1978, p. 35).
60. See, for example, Collier and Collier (1991).
61. See Arnone, Laurens, and Segalotto (2006) for a comprehensive overview.
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interference.
Vittorio Grilli, Donato Masciandaro, and Guido Tabellini developed
an index based on work by Hans Aufricht that emphasizes political inde-
pendence, as measured by the procedures regarding the appointment of
the central bank board, the relationship between the bank and the govern-
ment in the formulation of monetary policy, and the formal responsibili-
ties of the bank.
62 They also measured economic independence, which
focuses on whether or not the central bank must ﬁnance government debt.
The current state of the art of measurement of de jure CBI stems from
Cukierman and his collaborators,
63 who constructed an index of de jure
CBI for seventy-two countries over the period 1950–89, coding the vari-
able for each of four ten-year periods, with the index remaining constant
within a given period. Their index is a weighted average of sixteen differ-
ent central bank characteristics.
64
Each of the above indices has various drawbacks. Mangano argues that
both the choice of criteria in the different indices and the interpretation of
laws involve signiﬁcant subjectivity.
65 It appears that these indices do not
capture de jure CBI only but are, at least in part, informative about how
monetary policy is being conducted in practice. Our focus on policy
reform makes it important that we focus on de jure CBI. A related problem
is that most existing work reports values for CBI indices computed at a
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62. Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991); Aufricht (1967).
63. Cukierman (1992); Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992).
64. Eight characteristics assessed the extent of limitations on central bank lending to the
government, and these collectively received half of the weight in the index. Four legal char-
acteristics that concern the way governors are appointed or dismissed were given one-ﬁfth of
the weight, three other characteristics that determined the degree of independence of the
bank’s policymaking process were given 15 percent of the total weight, and a measure
related to the objectives of the central bank was given the remaining 15 percent.
65. Mangano (1998). In particular, from a comparison of the Cukierman and Grilli-
Masciandaro-Tabellini (GMT) indices, Mangano (1998, pp. 476–77) concludes that “[there
is] a signiﬁcant degree of inconsistency between the two indices’ valuation of their common
criteria. In only one country out of seventeen and in the case of one criterion out of nine have
Cukierman and GMT translated the legislation in exactly the same way: their interpretations
of the laws governing the Italian central bank, and of the regulations concerning the central
bank governors’ terms of ofﬁce in the countries sampled, exhibit no divergence. On the other
hand, the average spread between their interpretations when examining Danish, French, Greek,
and Japanese legislation is close to 50 percent, and they disagree in nearly 60 percent of coun-
tries when deciding whether the central bank is legally allowed to purchase government debt
in the primary market. Overall, it appears that in the seventeen countries included in both
[Cukierman’s] and GMT’s samples, virtually a third of the values attributed to their nine
common criteria are subject to nonnegligible interpretation problems.”
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our empirical strategy based on panel ﬁxed-effects regressions.
66
To overcome these problems, we measure de jure CBI by a dummy
variable that takes a value of one in every year after a major reform to the
constitution or the central bank law leading to increased independence, and
zero elsewhere. The advantage of this measure is that it does not incorpo-
rate information on the de facto conduct of monetary policy. A drawback
is that this measure assumes that CBI increases by the same magnitude in
every country following a reform, which we know is not true, because
reforms in different countries have introduced different levels of indepen-
dence. Nevertheless, it captures in a simple way the effect of central bank
reform and changes in de jure CBI.
Our main sample consists of fifty-two countries for which informa-
tion on changes in central bank legislation was reported by Luis Jácome
and Francisco Vásquez, and by Simone Polillo and Mauro Guillén.
67 We
exclude all former socialist countries, because data for these countries
before CBI are limited, and many enacted CBI at the same time as many
other reforms associated with the transition from planned to market
economies. We also exclude Africa, since central bank reforms in these
countries are hard to identify and interpret, and in most cases their
reforms have fallen short of creating truly independent central banks.
68
Our sample does, however, include almost every OECD and Latin
American country and a sample of thirteen Asian countries.
69 To construct
our CBI dummy for Latin American countries, we used the dates of major
central bank reforms provided by Jácome and Vásquez.
70 For the remain-
ing countries the CBI dummy takes a value equal to one starting in the
year in which the Cukierman index constructed by Polillo and Guillén
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66. Exceptions that construct and use time-varying indices are Polillo and Guillén
(2005), who provide values of the Cukierman index for the period 1989–2000 for a sample
of ninety countries; Jácome and Vasquez (2005) for Latin America; Cukierman, Miller, and
Neyapti (2002) for a sample of former Soviet countries; Arnone and others (2007) for a sam-
ple of emerging market countries; and Crowe and Meade (2007) for a sample of 102 coun-
tries worldwide. Both Arnone and others (2007) and Crowe and Meade (2007) explore
time-series variation in these indices by taking values of them at two points in time (the late
1980s and the early twenty-ﬁrst century) and assume that the change from one value to
another occurs in the year in which central bank reform takes place.
67. Jácome and Vásquez (2005); Polillo and Guillén (2005).
68. For example, the Cukierman index of central bank independence reported by Polillo
and Guillén (2005) is very low for most African countries, and reforms to the central bank
charters during the 1990s caused only very small increases in these indices.
69. See the online appendix at econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/acemoglu.
70. Jácome and Vásquez (2005).
11302-05_Acemoglu_rev.qxd  9/12/08  1:06 PM  Page 375increases.71 Moreover, for every country we used information from Marco
Arnone and coauthors,
72 who report the years of major central bank
reforms, to verify that a major reform did take place in the year in which
the index constructed by Polillo and Guillén increases. Whenever there
was disagreement between the two sources, we consulted additional
sources (such as the central bank’s website) to identify the year in which
the most substantial reform toward CBI (if any) took place. Similarly, for
countries for which the index constructed by Polillo and Guillén did not
increase between 1989 and 2000, we used Arnone and coauthors and
other sources to explore whether a central bank reform took place after
2000. A list of the countries included in our sample and the details of the
coding, including the laws that have amended central bank charters, as
well as additional sources used, can be found in the online appendix. Most
central bank reforms in these countries took place during the 1990s.
We also examined the impact of CBI on the forty of these ﬁfty-two coun-
tries whose degree of CBI changed over our sample period. Focusing on
this sample enables us to obtain identiﬁcation from differences in the timing
of CBI; the countries in this sample might also be more homogeneous, since
all have undergone the same policy reform.
Although we believe our CBI dummy provides a transparent way of
investigating the relationship between CBI and inﬂation, we also study the
robustness of our results by using the Cukierman index. Since these data are
not in the form of an annual time series, and earlier data exhibit almost no
variation, we take the value of the index in 1989 and assume that this value
holds for all pre-CBI periods. We then use the 2003 value from Crowe and
Meade for all post-CBI periods.
73
Our main measure of political institutions is constraints on the executive,
from the Polity IV dataset, which codes the extent of constitutional limits
on the exercise of arbitrary power by the executive.
74 The Polity dataset
reports a qualitative score between 1 and 7 for every independent country.
We computed the average of the constraints on the executive variable for
the period 1972–2004 and then classified each country in our sample
according to whether it has weak, medium, or strong constraints on the
376 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2008
71. Polillo and Guillén (2005).
72. Arnone and others (2007).
73. Crowe and Meade (2007).
74. These data are maintained by the Center for Systemic Peace and the Center for
Global Policy at George Mason University and are available at www.systemicpeace.org/
polity/polity4.htm.
11302-05_Acemoglu_rev.qxd  9/12/08  1:06 PM  Page 376executive.75 Countries within one standard deviation of the sample mean
for the constraints measure were assigned to the medium-constraints cate-
gory, and the rest were assigned to either the strong-constraints or the weak-
constraints group. Figure 3 shows the distribution of average constraints on
the executive for our sample as well as the cutoffs for the different cate-
gories. Appendix table A1 shows the category in which each country was
classiﬁed. The weak- and medium-constraints countries are found mainly in
Asia and Latin America; most OECD countries are in the strong-constraints
category.
To verify that our results are not driven by the speciﬁc cutoffs used in
creating the weak-, medium-, and strong-constraints groups, we also look
at the interaction of a quadratic function of the average constraints on the
executive with the CBI dummy. We show that the results obtained using
this approach are similar to those estimated using the dummies for weak,
medium, and strong constraints.
In addition, we check the robustness of our results using different mea-
sures of institutions. In particular, we use the rule-of-law and the control-
of-corruption indices constructed by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and
Massimo Mastruzzi for the period 1996–2005.
76 These indices are reported
on a scale from −2.5 to 2.5 and are based on subjective perceptions reported
by experts from the public sector, the private sector, and nongovernmental
organizations.
77 The classiﬁcation of countries on these variables, following
the same one-standard-deviation rule described above, is reported in appen-
dix table A1. Broadly speaking, the classiﬁcations under the three institu-
tional variables are similar. The most notable exception is Singapore, which
is classiﬁed as having weak constraints on the executive, but strong institu-
tions in terms of both the rule-of-law and control-of-corruption indices.
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75. We use the average of constraints on the executive over 1972–2004 rather than its
value at the beginning of the period or its year-to-year variation, because the average value
of this variable appears to provide a better and less noisy measure of how constrained politi-
cians are in a given country. The changes in this variable from year to year are subject to
potential miscodings, which are averaged out when we consider the average constraints on
the executive over a reasonable period of time.
76. Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007). One advantage of these indices is that they
measure institutional quality around the time of CBI for most countries.
77. The rule-of-law question asks respondents the extent to which they have conﬁdence
in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence; the control-of-corruption
question asks the extent to which respondents perceive public power as exercised for private
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption as well as capture of the state by
elites and private interests (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2007, p. 4).
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78. The inﬂation data reported for Qatar by IFS show an unusual spike in 1998 and
1999. Rather than verify and, where necessary, modify the IMF data for every country, we
use the data exactly as reported. However, all our results are robust to excluding Qatar from
the sample.
79. Normalized inﬂation is deﬁned as inﬂation/(1 + inﬂation); see equation 11 in the
next section.
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Polity IV.
5
10
15
No. of countries
Weak constraints Medium constraints
Strong
constraints
Average score
1.0–1.99 2.0–2.99 3.0–3.90 3.91–4.99 5.0–5.99 6.0–6.99 7.0
Figure 3. Distribution of Countries by Average Executive Constraints Score
Our main dependent variable, inflation, was obtained from the Inter-
national Financial Statistics (IFS) of the International Monetary Fund and
is deﬁned as the annual percentage change in the consumer price index.
78
Figures B1, B2, and B3 in appendix B plot the inﬂation data over time as
well as the date of CBI for all the countries in our sample. Figure B1
focuses on the eight countries categorized as having weak constraints on
the executive, ﬁgure B2 on the twenty-ﬁve medium-constraints countries,
and ﬁgure B3 on the nineteen countries with strong constraints. To isolate
changes in inﬂation in individual countries, in all three ﬁgures the average
of normalized world inﬂation is subtracted from each country’s normalized
inﬂation rate; thus a value of zero indicates that the country’s inﬂation rate
is at the world average.
79
Figure B1 presents a mixed picture with respect to the association
between inﬂation and CBI in countries with the weakest constraints. In
China and Guyana a decline in inﬂation is seen following the introduction
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and the introduction of CBI in 2002 in both countries appears to have had
no effect on this process. Figure B2 shows several cases of signiﬁcant dis-
inﬂation concurrent with the introduction of CBI. This happens in Colom-
bia and Argentina, as discussed in the introduction, but it also seems to
occur in Turkey and Uruguay. In a number of countries, such as Bolivia,
Chile, and Greece, inﬂation starts declining before CBI. Finally, ﬁgure B3
shows no case where CBI is followed by a large fall in inﬂation.
Comparison of ﬁgures B1 and B2 shows that in contrast to our theoreti-
cal model, inﬂation is generally higher in medium-constraints countries than
in weak-constraints countries. We do not have an explanation for this
pattern. It may reflect the fact that in countries with weak constraints,
politicians have access to other instruments for achieving their political
objectives and do not need to rely primarily on monetary policy, which
may be a relatively blunt instrument for achieving clientelistic objectives
or self-enrichment.
Our data on government expenditure as a percentage of GDP were
obtained from the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Out-
look.
80 In our robustness checks we also use additional macroeconomic
variables to control for other time-varying determinants of inﬂation. We
use the logarithm of GDP per capita (in constant prices, using the chain
series from the Penn World Tables 6.2). Also, to control for the extent to
which ﬁxed exchange rate regimes might have provided an anchor for
inﬂation and limited the discretionary use of monetary policy, we use an
index of exchange rate ﬂexibility constructed by Carmen Reinhart and
Rogoff.
81 This index takes values between one and six, with higher values
corresponding to more-ﬂexible exchange rate regimes. The index is
reported on an annual basis and covers the period 1972–2001.
Central Bank Independence and Inﬂation
In this section we present our main empirical results concerning the rela-
tionship between CBI and inﬂation. Throughout, the left-hand-side vari-
able is deﬁned as
() , ,
,
,
11
1
yct
ct
ct
=
+
inflation
inflation
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80. Government expenditure corresponds to “Total Expenditure and Net Lending by the
General Government” (variable GGTENL in World Economic Outlook).
81. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004).
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inﬂation) for country c in year t. This transformation is useful, since other-
wise hyperinﬂationary episodes entirely dominate the analysis. An alterna-
tive would have been to use the logarithm of inﬂation, but this is not
possible when there are cases of zero inﬂation. Moreover, using logarithms
would shift the outlier problem to cases in which inﬂation is very low.
With a slight abuse of terminology, we refer to yc,t as inﬂation rather than
as normalized inﬂation.
It should be noted throughout that changes in CBI are neither ran-
domly assigned nor exogenous, so the empirical work we present here is
intended to uncover robust correlations between central banking reform
and contemporaneous or subsequent declines in inflation. As noted in the
introduction, CBI is often adopted as part of a package of anti-inflation
policies, and this can be seen in figures B1 and B2 in appendix B, which
reveal a number of instances in which inflation starts declining a few
years before CBI. This is indicative of a pattern in which other anti-inﬂation
measures are adopted simultaneously with or just before the introduction
of CBI.
The Main Effect of Central Bank Independence on Inﬂation
Our general estimating equation for the results reported in table 1 is
Here the ﬁrst summation includes lags of inﬂation and helps us control for
potential serial correlation in this variable. The variable of interest is the
dummy for CBI, described in the previous section and denoted by xc,t.
Since CBI may have delayed effects, we sometimes also control for lags of
CBI, as shown by the second summation. For simplicity, the same number
of lags is used for inﬂation as for CBI. In addition, all regressions include
δc, which stands for a full set of country dummies, and ωt, which is a full set
of year dummies. The error term c,t captures all omitted inﬂuences. Since
CBI is not randomly assigned, this disturbance term may be correlated with
some of the right-hand-side variables. It is therefore important to interpret
the estimates we report as conditional correlations rather than causal
effects. c,t may also have residual serial correlation, and to control for this
we report throughout standard errors that are fully robust for arbitrary se-
rial correlation at the country level (that is, clustered at the country level).
82
() ,, ,, 12
1
0
1
yy xx ct j ct j
j
k
ct j ct j
j
k
=+ + −
=
−
= ∑∑ ζφ φ + +++ δωε ct c t , .
380 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2008
82. See Wooldridge (2002).
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tries. Columns 1-4 through 1-6 repeat the same regressions but focus on
the sample of countries that changed their CBI during the sample period,
and thus rely only on differences in the timing of CBI to identify its effect
on inﬂation. Column 1-1 includes only the contemporaneous CBI dummy,
xc,t. The estimate of φ0 is −0.036, with a (robust) standard error of 0.034.
Thus, in this ﬁrst speciﬁcation, the effect of CBI on inﬂation is negative,
but this effect is not statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level, and the
coefﬁcient is rather small. This estimate implies that CBI is associated
with a reduction in the annual inﬂation rate by 9 percentage points at the
sample mean inﬂation rate of 58 percent.
83
The speciﬁcation in column 1-1 does not control for persistence in inﬂa-
tion, however. Since inﬂation is a highly serially correlated variable, doing
so can have major effects on the estimates. Column 1-2 therefore includes
five lags of inflation but still includes only the contemporaneous CBI
dummy. When these lags are included, one can distinguish between the
short- and the long-run effects of CBI. The short-run effect is still given by 
φ0, whereas the long-run effect is .
Column 1-2 reports both of these effects, together with the p-value for the
statistical signiﬁcance of the long-run effect. It shows that neither the short-
run nor the long-run effect is signiﬁcant. For example, the long-run effect is
about double the impact of CBI on inﬂation suggested in column 1-1, but
it falls short of conventional levels of significance (p = 0.13). The lags of
inflation themselves are highly significant. The results in the first two
columns therefore show that despite the preponderance of theory and some
evidence that CBI is important in practice, in this broad sample of countries
the effect of CBI on inﬂation is modest and not statistically signiﬁcant.
Column 1-3 also includes the ﬁve lags of the CBI dummy. In this case,
however, the long-run effect is given by . In this speciﬁcation the
short-run effect is −0.031 (suggesting that CBI decreases inflation by 
φ
ζ
j
j
k
j
j
k
=
=
∑
∑ −
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k
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83. To calculate the economic magnitude of the coefﬁcient estimates, we use average
annual inﬂation over our sample period. If instead we use median annual inﬂation (8 percent
instead of 58 percent), φ0 is even smaller and suggests that CBI reduces inﬂation by 4 per-
centage points. Throughout, the economic magnitudes implied by median inﬂation are about
60 percent smaller than those implied by mean inﬂation.
11302-05_Acemoglu_rev.qxd  9/12/08  1:06 PM  Page 3818 percentage points) and is again insigniﬁcant. The long-run effect is esti-
mated to be −0.087 (suggesting that CBI decreases inﬂation by 22 percent-
age points) but is also insigniﬁcant.
Column 1-4 reestimates the basic model reported in column 1-1 using
the smaller subsample of countries that underwent a change in CBI. The
estimated effect is now −0.063, with a standard error of 0.030, and is thus
now signiﬁcant, as are the results in columns 1-5 and 1-6, which repeat the
regressions in columns 1-2 and 1-3, respectively, using the smaller sub-
sample. Both the short- and the long-run effects are negative, and the esti-
mated effects are larger. The basic ﬁnding of table 1, then, is of some weak
evidence that CBI does reduce inﬂation, especially when one looks only at
the sample of countries that changed their CBI over the period.
Central Bank Independence, Political Constraints, and Inﬂation
Why does CBI not have a quantitatively more signiﬁcant effect on inﬂa-
tion? The answer we will propose is based on our motivating theory,
namely, that CBI will have a strong effect on inﬂation only in societies
with intermediate levels of constraints on politicians. Let Sc, Mc, and Wc be
382 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2008
Table 1. OLS Fixed-Effects Regressions of Inﬂation on Central Bank Independencea
Countries with change
Full sample (52 countries) in CBI only (40 countries)
Variable 1-1 1-2 1-3 1-4 1-5 1-6
CBI dummy,b short-run −0.036 −0.019 −0.031 −0.063 −0.028 −0.040
effect (0.034) (0.012) (0.022) (0.030) (0.013) (0.023)
CBI dummy, long-run −0.079 −0.087 −0.119 −0.164
effect
p-value, long-run effect [0.129] [0.126] [0.051] [0.021]
p-value, ﬁve lags of  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
inﬂation = 0
p-value, current and [0.826] [0.072]
ﬁve lags of CBI
dummy = 0
No. of observations 1,670 1,500 1,500 1,300 1,172 1,172
Adjusted R
2 0.50 0.83 0.83 0.47 0.84 0.84
Source: Authors’ regressions.
a. The dependent variable is inﬂation/(1 + inﬂation), using inﬂation data from International Monetary
Fund, International Financial Statistics. The sample period is 1972–2005. Each column reports a single
ordinary least squares regression using unbalanced panel data with one observation per year, per country
and including country and year ﬁxed effects. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by country,
are in parentheses.
b. Takes a value of one in every year after a substantial reform to the country’s central bank laws leading
to more independence is introduced.
11302-05_Acemoglu_rev.qxd  9/12/08  1:06 PM  Page 382dummy variables denoting a strong-, a medium-, or a weak-constraints
country, respectively. Including interactions with these dummies, the gen-
eral estimating equation becomes
This equation implies that φ0
S measures the short-run effect of CBI on
countries with strong constraints on the executive, whereas with the full set
of lags included,
corresponds to the long-run effect for these countries. The short-run and the
long-run effects for medium- and weak-constraints countries are deﬁned
analogously. Equation 13 also includes a vector of country- and time-
varying covariates Zc,t (with a vector of coefﬁcients denoted by ). These
covariates will be included in the robustness checks reported in table 7.
Table 2 reports the results of estimating equation 13 on our base sample,
with constraints measured in terms of the average constraints on the execu-
tive from the Polity IV data as described above. The ﬁrst three columns use
data for the whole sample. Column 2-1 is again the most parsimonious
speciﬁcation, omitting any lags of inﬂation or of the CBI dummy. The esti-
mates suggest that CBI has no effect on inflation in weak- and strong-
constraints countries but has a marginally significant effect of −0.071
(standard error of 0.044) in the sample of medium-constraints countries.
This effect is twice the size of the estimate in column 1-1, showing that
almost all of the effect in table 1 is due to the impact of CBI on inflation
in countries with intermediate constraints. Moreover, the p-values at the bot-
tom of the table indicate that we can reject the null hypothesis that the
impact of CBI in the medium-constraints group is equal to that in the
weak- or the strong-constraints groups.
Column 2-2 shows similar results when the lags of inﬂation are included,
and again the effect of CBI on inﬂation is statistically signiﬁcant at about
the 7 percent level. However, in this case, even though the long-run effect
long-run effect
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constraints group, we can no longer reject the null hypothesis that they are
equal. (But we continue to reject the null hypothesis that the effect is the
same in strong- as in medium-constraints countries.)
Column 2-3 reports the speciﬁcation that includes the lags of CBI as
well as the lags of inﬂation. Now the long-run effect in the sample of coun-
tries with intermediate constraints is larger, at −0.125, and is signiﬁcant at
about the 6 percent level. The effects in countries with strong or weak con-
straints continue to be insigniﬁcant. In this speciﬁcation we can reject at
the 10 percent level the null hypothesis that the effect of CBI is the same
in the medium- and weak-constraints countries (and we continue to reject,
at the 1 percent level, the null hypothesis that it is the same in the strong-
and medium-constraints countries).
Columns 2-4 through 2-6 estimate the same models for the sample of
countries that experienced a change in CBI. The effects of CBI in the
medium-constraints countries are now quantitatively larger and more signif-
icant. The short-run effect in column 2-4, −0.097, is signiﬁcant and implies
that CBI is associated with a decline in inﬂation of 24 percentage points for
this group of countries.
84 We continue to reject the null hypotheses that this
effect is the same as that for strong- or weak-constraints countries. In
columns 2-5 and 2-6, once we include lags of the CBI dummy and inﬂa-
tion, the short-run effect becomes smaller and less signiﬁcant, but the
long-run effects are statistically and economically signiﬁcant. For exam-
ple, the effect in column 2-6, −0.196, implies that CBI reduces inﬂation by
49 percentage points. As in the ﬁrst three columns, there is no evidence
that CBI inﬂuences inﬂation in countries with strong constraints. However,
the results reported in these columns show some evidence that CBI might
have a negative long-run effect on inﬂation in weak-constraints countries,
although this effect is smaller than that for medium-constraints countries.
We conclude from this evidence that the conditional correlations between
the introduction of CBI and changes in inﬂation are broadly consistent with
the ideas suggested in the theoretical discussion above. In particular, CBI
appears to be followed by a decline in inflation in countries with inter-
mediate constraints on politicians, but there is no evidence of a negative
effect of CBI on inﬂation in strong-constraints countries. In weak-constraints
countries there is typically no effect of CBI on inﬂation, although some
speciﬁcations show negative but (usually) less signiﬁcant effects. Although
ACEMOGLU, JOHNSON, QUERUBÍN, and ROBINSON 385
84. If we use median inﬂation to calculate the magnitude of the coefﬁcient, the coefﬁ-
cient implies that CBI reduces inﬂation by 11 percentage points.
11302-05_Acemoglu_rev.qxd  9/12/08  1:06 PM  Page 385we can reject the null hypothesis that the effect of CBI on inflation dif-
fers between strong- and medium-constraints countries, we can reject the
same hypothesis in only some of the speciﬁcations for medium- and weak-
constraints countries.
Robustness
Tables 3 through 7 investigate the robustness of the results in tables 1
and 2. Table 3 replicates columns 2-1, 2-3, 2-4, and 2-6 of table 2 but
replaces the Polity IV executive constraints measure with the rule-of-law
and control-of-corruption indices constructed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and
Mastruzzi.
85 The results in columns 3-1 through 3-4, based on the full sam-
ple, are similar to those in columns 1-1 through 1-3 of table 1 and do not
show statistically signiﬁcant effects of CBI. The results in columns 3-5
through 3-8, which focus on the sample of countries that experienced a
change in CBI, are more encouraging. They are broadly similar to those in
columns 2-4 through 2-6 of table 2. Columns 3-5 and 3-7 show evidence of
a statistically signiﬁcant short-run effect of CBI on inﬂation only in coun-
tries with institutions of medium strength, whether using the rule-of-law
index (column 3-5) or the control-of-corruption index (column 3-7). These
coefﬁcients are similar in magnitude to those reported in column 2-4 of
table 2. Columns 3-6 and 3-8, on the other hand, show evidence of a negative
and statistically signiﬁcant long-run effect of CBI on inﬂation in both the
medium- and the weak-institutions countries. These results again show
that the effects in the medium- and strong-institutions countries are statisti-
cally different, but we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the effects in the
weak- and the medium-institutions countries are equal. Overall, the results
using the alternative measures of institutions are generally consistent with
those reported in table 2, although with these measures the differences
between the weak and the medium categories are less pronounced.
An econometric problem in the estimation of equation 13 is that it
includes both ﬁxed effects and lagged dependent variables. In the presence
of the latter, the key regressor xc,t (and its lags) will be mechanically corre-
lated with c,s for s < t, so that the standard ﬁxed-effects estimator, used in
table 2, is inconsistent.
86 However, it can be shown that the ﬁxed-effects
estimator becomes consistent as the number of time periods in the sample
increases (that is, as T →∞ ). Even though our sample covers a relatively
large number of time periods, this source of inconsistency might still be
386 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2008
85. Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007).
86. See, for example, Wooldridge (2002, ch. 11).
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important depending on how close to a unit root the inﬂation dynamics are.
The most common way of ensuring consistency in this case is to use the
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator developed by Manuel
Arellano and Stephen Bond.
87 This involves differencing equation 13 to
eliminate ﬁxed effects, so that we have
and then using lags of yc,t and xc,t to instrument for the differenced terms
(here Δyc,t = yc,t − yc,t−1 and so on). These lags will be valid instruments to
solve the endogeneity problem resulting from the mechanical correlation
between xc,t and the error term if there is no additional serial correlation in
c,t (so that there is no second-order serial correlation in Δc,t), which can
be tested. Table 4 reports the results of estimating equation 14 on the same
samples and speciﬁcations as in columns 2-2, 2-3, 2-5, and 2-6 of table 2.
(Here and throughout the rest of the paper, Sc, Mc, and Wc are again based
on the Polity IV executive constraints variable.) The results are similar
to those of table 2. In particular, the interactions between the medium-
constraints dummy and CBI are still negative, and the estimates are almost
all statistically more significant than in table 2. There is no evidence of
a negative effect of CBI on inﬂation in strong-constraints countries. The
results in table 4 also show some evidence of a negative effect of CBI in
weak-constraints countries once we focus on the sample of countries that
changed their CBI, in columns 4-3 and 4-4. Nevertheless, these results
should be interpreted with caution: although the tests for serial correlation
cannot reject the null hypothesis of no second-order correlation in the differ-
enced residuals, the Sargan overidentiﬁcation tests reject the null hypothesis
in all columns, which implies that different lags estimate different magni-
tudes for the coefﬁcients of CBI and lagged inﬂation (which is often a
problem when using this GMM procedure with large T).
Table 5 investigates an alternative to the use of the three dummy vari-
ables Sc, Mc, and Wc for strong-, medium-, and weak-constraints countries to
capture the nonlinear effects of this variable, namely, the use of a quadratic
term in the average of constraints on the executive interacted with the CBI
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Table 4. Arellano-Bond GMM Regressions of Inﬂation on Central Bank Independence
Interacted with Executive Constraintsa
Countries with
change in 
Full sample CBI only
Variable 4-1 4-2 4-3 4-4
CBI dummy × weak- −0.010 −0.059 −0.050 −0.091
constraints dummy (0.040) (0.048) (0.024) (0.042)
CBI dummy × medium- −0.046 −0.060 −0.053 −0.063
constraints dummy (0.027) (0.037) (0.021) (0.032)
CBI dummy × strong- 0.032 0.034 0.010 0.012
constraints dummy (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013)
CBI × weak constraints,  −0.039 −0.049 −0.203 −0.203
long-run effect
p-value, long-run effect, [0.804] [0.725] [0.043] [0.035]
weak constraints = 0
CBI × medium constraints,  −0.181 −0.191 −0.217 −0.273
long-run effect
p-value, long-run effect, [0.068] [0.063] [0.034] [0.011]
medium constraints = 0
CBI × strong constraints,  0.129 0.111 0.040 −0.014
long-run effect
p-value, long-run effect, [0.072] [0.186] [0.480] [0.830]
strong constraints = 0
p-value, ﬁve lags of inﬂation = 0 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
p-value, current and ﬁve lags  [0.042] [0.005]
of CBI dummy,
weak constraints = 0
p-value, current and ﬁve lags  [0.541] [0.074]
of CBI dummy, 
medium constraints = 0
p-value, current and ﬁve lags  [0.210] [0.326]
of CBI dummy,
strong constraints = 0
p-value, medium effect = [0.387] [0.236] [0.890] [0.445]
weak effect
b
p-value, medium effect = [0.001] [0.000] [0.003] [0.001]
strong effect
b
Sargan test [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Second-order serial correlation [0.59] [0.45] [0.99] [0.85]
No. of observations 1,358 1,358 1,060 1,060
Source: Authors’ regressions.
a. The dependent variable is inﬂation/(1 + inﬂation), using inﬂation data from International Monetary
Fund, International Financial Statistics. Each column reports a single regression using unbalanced panel
data with one observation per year per country and including year dummies. Robust standard errors are
in parentheses. The GMM (Arellano-Bond) estimation method uses all available lags of inﬂation as
instruments.
b. p-values in all columns are for the long-run effects.
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88. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004).
dummy. The coefﬁcients reported evaluate the quadratic at levels 1, 4, and
7 of constraints on the executive. The results are broadly similar to those in
table 2. The short- and the long-run effects of CBI on inﬂation are always
negative and signiﬁcant for countries with medium constraints. There is no
evidence of a signiﬁcant effect of CBI in countries with strong or weak con-
straints. However, we can reject the hypothesis that the effects are equal
only when comparing the strong- and the medium-constraints groups. Over-
all, these results suggest that the speciﬁc way of parameterizing the non-
linearity in the exact cutoffs between weak and medium, and medium and
strong, constraints does not matter greatly to our results.
Table 6 reports the results of a simple falsiﬁcation exercise. Each regres-
sion this time includes the interaction of each of the executive constraints
dummies with both the contemporaneous CBI and its ﬁve-year lead. To the
extent that inﬂation was already declining in some countries before central
bank reform, this lead variable will capture the decline. When this is the
case, we cannot have much conﬁdence that CBI is in fact a major factor in
the decline in inﬂation. The table shows that the contemporaneous effect of
CBI in countries with intermediate constraints is still signiﬁcant. The coef-
ﬁcient on the ﬁve-year lead is never negative for this group and is typically
very small. Hence the negative association between CBI and inﬂation in
this group of countries is not driven mainly by a secular decline in inﬂa-
tion. For strong-constraints countries, the lead of CBI is likewise never
signiﬁcant and is typically very small. For weak-constraints countries there
is some evidence of an upward trend in inﬂation preceding CBI. This sug-
gests that in some of these cases CBI may have been introduced in the
midst of episodes of particularly high inﬂation.
Finally, table 7 reports results from a range of other robustness checks.
The top panel focuses on the full sample and reports results of speciﬁca-
tions corresponding to columns 2-1 and 2-3 in table 2. In the bottom panel
the sample is restricted to countries that changed their CBI during the sam-
ple period, and speciﬁcations corresponding to columns 2-4 and 2-6 of
table 2 are reported. Columns 7-1 and 7-2 in both panels report the robust-
ness of the results to including potential time-varying determinants of
inﬂation. In particular, we include ﬁve lags of the logarithm of GDP per
capita and ﬁve lags of the exchange rate ﬂexibility index constructed by
Reinhart and Rogoff, described above.
88 Although the negative effect of
CBI on inﬂation is not signiﬁcant in the full sample, the results in the bot-
tom panel show a pattern similar to that depicted in table 2, with a negative
11302-05_Acemoglu_rev.qxd  9/12/08  1:06 PM  Page 392and statistically signiﬁcant long-run effect of CBI only in the group with
intermediate constraints on the executive. The results in columns 7-3 and
7-4 include a quadratic time trend interacted with regional dummies to
control for differing trends in inﬂation across world regions. These addi-
tional controls have little effect on the estimates. In column 7-3 in the top
panel, the estimate of the impact of CBI in medium-constraints countries is
−0.065, with a standard error of 0.044, which is similar to that reported in
column 2-1 of table 2. The long-run effect in column 7-4, however, is
smaller and less signiﬁcant than that in column 2-2. Nevertheless, the
results in the bottom panel for columns 7-3 and 7-4 show that in the sample
of countries that changed CBI, once we control for differences in regional
trends, the results are again similar to those in table 2.
In columns 7-5 and 7-6 we exclude the Western European countries
from the sample entirely. This robustness check is motivated by the concern
that policy dynamics and the effect of CBI on inﬂation might be different in
Western Europe than in the rest of the world. The results, however, are
again similar to the baseline estimates.
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Table 6. Regressions of Inﬂation on Five-Year Lead of Central Bank Independence
Interacted with Executive Constraintsa
Countries with
Full sample change in CBI only
Variable 6-1 6-2 6-3 6-4
CBI dummy × weak-constraints −0.007 −0.044 −0.013 −0.048
dummy (0.017) (0.020) (0.017) (0.019)
CBI dummy × medium-constraints −0.119 −0.035 −0.132 −0.042
dummy (0.056) (0.020) (0.050) (0.020)
CBI dummy × strong-constraints 0.032 0.006 0.023 0.002
dummy (0.020) (0.005) (0.019) (0.006)
CBI dummy, t + 5 × weak- 0.052 0.030 0.032 0.022
constraints dummy (0.024) (0.015) (0.029) (0.014)
CBI dummy, t + 5 × medium- 0.083 0.016 0.070 0.012
constraints dummy (0.042) (0.010) (0.046) (0.010)
CBI dummy, t + 5 × strong- −0.001 0.002 −0.018 −0.006
constraints dummy (0.019) (0.007) (0.024) (0.008)
p-value, ﬁve lags of inﬂation = 0 [0.000] [0.000]
No. of observations 1,514 1,344 1,180 1,052
Adjusted R
2 0.54 0.83 0.51 0.84
Source: Authors’ regressions.
a. The dependent variable is inﬂation/(1 + inﬂation), using inﬂation data from International Monetary
Fund, International Financial Statistics. Each column reports a single ordinary least squares regression
using unbalanced panel data with one observation per year per country and including country and year
ﬁxed effects. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by country, are in parentheses.
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11302-05_Acemoglu_rev.qxd  9/12/08  1:06 PM  Page 397Columns 7-7 and 7-8 include an additional dummy for the introduction
of the European Central Bank, or for the country in question joining the
European monetary union after the European Central Bank was established.
Again there is little change from the results in table 2.
Finally, columns 7-9 and 7-10 show the robustness of our results to using
the CBI index constructed by Cukierman rather than the CBI dummy.
Despite the concerns discussed above related to the coding and interpreta-
tion of this index, it still constitutes a useful check on our measure of CBI
and on our results. The results using this index are again similar to those
reported in table 2: only the interaction between the medium-constraints
dummy and the Cukierman CBI index is negative and statistically signiﬁ-
cant.
89 Interestingly, in columns 7-5 through 7-10 for both panels we can
now reject at the 10 percent level the null hypothesis that the effects in the
intermediate-constraints group are equal to those in the weak-constraints
group as well as in the strong-constraints group.
We also examined the robustness of the results reported in table 2 to
the type of CBI that different countries implemented. To do this we ran
the same regressions as in table 2 but included a dummy for goal inde-
pendence of the CBI. This dummy takes a value of one for countries
where CBI reform defined inflation as the unique objective of monetary
policy, and zero elsewhere. This is a useful robustness check against the
possibility that CBI may have very different effects where the central
banker is truly conservative, with price stability the unique objective (as
with the German Bundesbank), than where CBI has multiple objectives
(as with the U.S. Federal Reserve). The results (not reported here) using
the goal independence dummy are analogous to those in table 2 and sug-
gest a similar pattern, with a negative effect of goal independence on
inflation found only for countries with intermediate constraints on the
executive. We also briefly investigated whether changes in the dynam-
ics and persistence of inflation in the mid-1980s, documented for exam-
ple by Haroon Mumtaz and Paolo Surico and by James Stock and Mark
Watson,
90 might be responsible for our results. As a crude control for
this possibility, we interacted the lags of inflation with a dummy for the
398 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2008
89. The coefficient in column 7-9 in the bottom panel, −0.224, implies that an increase
of one standard deviation in the index is associated with a decrease of 11 percentage
points in the inflation rate in countries with intermediate constraints. The coefficient in
column 7-10, on the other hand, suggests that an increase of one standard deviation in the
CBI index decreases inflation by 18 percentage points in the long run.
90. Mumtaz and Surico (2006); Stock and Watson (2007).
11302-05_Acemoglu_rev.qxd  9/12/08  1:06 PM  Page 398period 1972–90 and a dummy for 1991–2005. The results (again not
reported here) exhibited a pattern similar to that in table 2, with a nega-
tive effect of CBI found only in countries with intermediate constraints
on the executive, although the statistical significance of some of the
estimates became weaker.
The Seesaw Effect
Here we investigate the implications of CBI reform for other dimensions
of policy. In particular, we look at whether CBI is followed by an increase
in government expenditure as a percentage of GDP in countries with inter-
mediate political constraints. Our basic econometric model is again equa-
tion 13, but now the dependent variable measures fiscal policy. Table 8
reports the different effects of CBI in strong-, medium-, and weak-constraints
countries on government expenditure as a percentage of GDP. No evi-
dence is found that introducing CBI in countries with strong or weak
constraints has any impact on government expenditure relative to GDP in
either the short or the long run. However, in medium-constraints countries,
where CBI was found above to be associated with declines in inﬂation, CBI
also appears to be associated with increases in government expenditure.
Both the short- and the long-run effects are positive for these countries in
all speciﬁcations, and in columns 8-2, 8-3, and 8-5 these effects are statis-
tically significant. In column 2 the estimated φ0
M is 0.011, with a standard
error of 0.004, which suggests an immediate increase in government
expenditure equivalent to just above 1 percent of GDP. The long-run effect
of 0.050 is also signiﬁcant and corresponds to a 5-percent-of-GDP increase
in government expenditure in the long run in medium-constraints countries
that have introduced CBI.
Table 9 shows that the broad pattern is similar when we use the Arellano-
Bond GMM estimator as in table 4. In this case the evidence consistent with
the seesaw effect is somewhat stronger, although now we also find some
positive long-run effect of CBI on government expenditure in weak-
constraints countries (see, for example, column 9-2). Finally, table 10 reports
results of a falsiﬁcation exercise similar to that in table 6. Here we again
include a ﬁve-year lead of the CBI dummy to check whether the estimates
in table 8 might be capturing a secular upward trend in government expen-
diture in countries with intermediate constraints. The results show no evi-
dence of such a pattern. The interaction between the medium-constraints
dummy and the ﬁve-year lead of the CBI dummy is never signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from zero.
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Table 9. Arellano-Bond GMM Regressions of Government Expenditure 
on Central Bank Independence Interacted with Executive Constraintsa
Countries with
Full sample change in CBI only
Variable 9-1 9-2 9-3 9-4
CBI dummy × weak-constraints 0.017 −0.008 0.008 −0.018
dummy (0.010) (0.027) (0.007) (0.026)
CBI dummy × medium-constraints 0.022 0.020 0.017 0.019
dummy (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
CBI dummy × strong-constraints 0.003 −0.001 −0.002 −0.004
dummy (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008)
CBI × weak constraints,  0.079 0.119 0.035 0.050
long-run effect
p-value, long-run effect, [0.069] [0.008] [0.242] [0.111]
weak constraints = 0
CBI × medium constraints,  0.105 0.111 0.075 0.063
long-run effect
p-value, long-run effect, [0.002] [0.016] [0.003] [0.160]
medium constraints = 0
CBI × strong constraints, 0.013 0.027 −0.010 −0.006
long-run effect
p-value, long-run effect, [0.577] [0.385] [0.633] [0.871]
strong constraints = 0
p-value, ﬁve lags of government [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
expenditure = 0
p-value, current and ﬁve lags [0.000] [0.036]
of CBI dummy, 
weak constraints = 0
p-value, current and ﬁve lags [0.024] [0.003]
of CBI dummy, medium
constraints = 0
p-value, current and ﬁve lags  [0.487] [0.206]
of CBI dummy, strong
constraints = 0
p-value, medium  [0.629] [0.855] [0.381] [0.707]
effect = weak effect
b
p-value, medium  [0.000] [0.004] [0.000] [0.004]
effect = strong effect
b
Sargan test [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Second-order serial correlation [0.41] [0.40] [0.25] [0.25]
No. of observations 1,137 1,137 848 848
Source: Authors’ regressions.
a. The dependent variable is general government expenditure, from International Monetary Fund,
World Economic Outlook. Each column reports a single regression using unbalanced panel data with one
observation per year per country and including year dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
The GMM (Arellano-Bond) estimation method uses all available lags of government expenditure as
instruments.
b. p-values in all columns are for the long-run effects.
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Table 10. Regressions of Government Expenditure on Five-Year Lead 
of Central Bank Independence Interacted with Executive Constraintsa
Countries with
Full sample change in CBI only
Variable 10-1 10-2 10-3 10-4
CBI dummy × weak-constraints dummy 0.061 0.018 0.069 0.018
(0.035) (0.007) (0.039) (0.008)
CBI dummy × medium-constraints dummy 0.008 0.013 0.028 0.017
(0.016) (0.004) (0.023) (0.005)
CBI dummy × strong-constraints dummy −0.021 −0.004 −0.011 −0.001
(0.018) (0.004) (0.025) (0.004)
CBI dummy × weak-constraints dummy, −0.140 −0.027 −0.111 −0.019
t + 5 (0.094) (0.021) (0.079) (0.018)
CBI dummy × medium-constraints dummy, 0.015 −0.003 0.033 0.001
t + 5 (0.018) (0.009) (0.028) (0.012)
CBI dummy × strong-constraints dummy, 0.025 0.005 0.052 0.011
t + 5 (0.021) (0.007) (0.032) (0.010)
p-value, ﬁve lags of government  [0.000] [0.000]
expenditure = 0
No. of observations 1,284 1,080 959 802
Adjusted R
2 0.80 0.93 0.79 0.94
Source: Authors’ regressions.
a. The dependent variable is general government expenditure, from International Monetary Fund,
World Economic Outlook, as a percent of GDP. Each column reports a single ordinary least squares
regression using unbalanced panel data with one observation per year per country and including country
and year ﬁxed effects. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by country, are in parentheses.
We also investigated whether CBI is associated with a change in the
government budget balance (again measured as a fraction of GDP). These
results (not reported here) reveal no signiﬁcant effect. One reason might be
that governments in medium-constraints countries, which do show a sig-
niﬁcant increase in spending, may have also raised revenue. Alternatively,
government balances may have improved automatically because these
governments held nominal debt and beneﬁted from the decline in interest
rates associated with reduced inﬂation. Counteracting this, however, they
are also likely to have experienced a reduction in the inﬂation tax.
We conclude that there is some suggestive evidence consistent with the
seesaw pattern, in that in some of the cases where CBI reduces inﬂation,
there may also be an increase in government expenditure as a share of
GDP. Nevertheless, this result is not always robust, and further investiga-
tion is necessary before reaching a ﬁrm conclusion.
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We have argued that in order to understand when policy reform will be
effective, one must understand the political context that leads to distor-
tionary policies in the ﬁrst place. Although such a claim would seem natural
to those steeped in the study of political economy, it appears not to have
inﬂuenced either the design of policy reform in the past or the recent wave
of revisionist research on the failures of reform. Rather, scholars have taken
some recent instances of failure to imply that the reforms themselves were
misconceived because of second-best problems. We believe that a much
more fruitful approach is to study the political economy constraints that
interact with both the implementation and the effects of reform.
To develop this perspective, we constructed a simple political economy
model of policy distortions and showed that when such distortions arise as
a result of the political equilibrium, strong forces exerted by those actors
initially beneﬁting from the distortions may negate the effects of the reform.
The model illustrates in a simple way that both the extent of distortionary
policy and the effects of reform will generally depend on political institu-
tions, for example on various measures of the constraints on political ofﬁce-
holders. The ﬁrst major insight of the model is that policy reform may not
be effective when constraints are so weak that reform can be undermined,
or when constraints are sufﬁciently strong that policy is unlikely to have
been highly distortionary to start with. Rather, it is at intermediate values
of constraints that policy reform might be most effective. The second
important lesson from the model is that with multiple policy instruments,
reform may lead to a seesaw effect, whereby effective or partially effective
reform in one dimension leads to more-intensive use of other distortionary
instruments.
The paper also provides empirical evidence consistent with these pat-
terns in the context of CBI. Our evidence suggests that CBI is associated
with signiﬁcant declines in inﬂation in countries with medium constraints,
but with no decline, or smaller declines, in countries with strong or weak
constraints. There is also some evidence that, consistent with the seesaw
effect, countries where CBI is associated with reduced inﬂation also expe-
rience an increase in government expenditure. This might partly reﬂect the
use of an alternative policy instrument to achieve goals that high inﬂation
was previously being used for.
Do these results imply that policy reform can never work? We do not
think this is the correct conclusion, for two reasons. First, our evidence is
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grams and CBI, can be effective. Second, the evidence is difﬁcult to recon-
cile with a naive approach that assumes that politicians adopt reforms for
well-meaning reasons or because they have decided that their old policies
were inappropriate. In this light, if reforms fail to be fully effective, it must
be at least partly because of the constraints imposed by existing political
economy factors. In particular, when reforms are promoted by international
organizations and imposed on reluctant leaders, they are less likely to be
effective or, at the very least, need to be designed much more carefully to
ensure their effectiveness. Otherwise our model and the empirical results
suggest that de jure reform may not translate into de facto reform, and when
it does, other dimensions of policy may deteriorate.
The general message of our paper is that the analysis of policy reform
should start with an understanding of the political economy constraints
that lead to distortionary policies in the ﬁrst place. This type of political
economy analysis might ultimately be useful both in predicting when
reforms are likely to be effective and in understanding how reforms can be
better designed to reduce the risk of backlash. Although we are currently
too far from a satisfactory theoretical or empirical understanding to be able
to design policy reforms that are robust to such challenges, this paper and
others in this vein should help make the case that an analysis of the politi-
cal economic roots of distortionary policies must be part of any debate on
the effectiveness and design of reforms.
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Table A1. Classiﬁcation of Countries by Strength of Executive Constraints 
and Institutions
Coding based Coding Coding based
on executive based on on control of
Country constraintsa rule of lawb corruptionb
Argentina Medium Medium Medium
Australia Strong Strong Strong
Austria Strong Strong Strong
Belgium Strong Medium Medium
Bolivia Medium Medium Weak
Brazil Medium Medium Medium
Canada Strong Strong Strong
Chile Medium Medium Medium
China Weak Medium Medium
Colombia Medium Weak Medium
Costa Rica Strong Medium Medium
Denmark Strong Strong Strong
Dominican Republic Medium Weak Medium
Ecuador Medium Weak Weak
El Salvador Medium Weak Medium
Finland Strong Strong Strong
France Medium Medium Medium
Germany Strong Strong Strong
Greece Medium Medium Medium
Guatemala Weak Weak Weak
Guyana Weak Medium Medium
Honduras Medium Weak Weak
India Medium Medium Medium
Indonesia Weak Weak Weak
Ireland Strong Strong Medium
Israel Strong Medium Medium
Italy Strong Medium Medium
Japan Strong Medium Medium
Korea Medium Medium Medium
Malaysia Medium Medium Medium
Mexico Medium Medium Medium
Mongolia Medium Medium Medium
Nepal Weak Medium Medium
Netherlands Strong Strong Strong
New Zealand Strong Strong Strong
Nicaragua Medium Weak Weak
Norway Strong Strong Strong
Pakistan Medium Weak Weak
Paraguay Weak Weak Weak
Peru Medium Weak Medium
Philippines Medium Medium Medium
Portugal Medium Medium Medium
Qatar Weak Medium Medium
(continued)
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Singapore Weak Strong Strong
Spain Medium Medium Medium
Sweden Strong Strong Strong
Switzerland Strong Strong Strong
Turkey Medium Medium Medium
United Kingdom Strong Strong Strong
United States Strong Strong Medium
Uruguay Medium Medium Medium
Venezuela Medium Weak Weak
Sources: Authors’ determinations based on sources indicated.
a. From Polity IV dataset.
b. From Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007) data.
Table A1. Classiﬁcation of Countries by Strength of Executive Constraints 
and Institutions (Continued)
Coding based Coding Coding based
on executive based on on control of
Country constraintsa rule of lawb corruptionb
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APPENDIX A
Figure B1. Difference from Average Normalized World Inﬂation for Countries 
with Weak Executive Constraints, 1972–2005
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics; Jácome and Vásquez (2005).
a. Figures show difference between normalized inflation, defined as 100  [inflation/(1 + inflation)], 
in the indicated country and the world average. See text and appendix table A1 for details.
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Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics; Jácome and Vásquez (2005).
a. Figures show difference between normalized inflation, defined as 100  [inflation/(1 + inflation)], 
in the indicated country and the world average. See text and appendix table A1 for details.
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Comments and Discussion
COMMENT BY
ALBERTO ALESINA This paper by Daron Acemoglu and his coauthors
addresses an important topic. In general terms, the question is when and
how policy reforms are successful or unsuccessful. More speciﬁcally, the
paper focuses on central bank independence (CBI), and its goal is to shed
some light on the inconclusive results in the literature regarding the bene-
ﬁts of CBI on inﬂation. I will focus relatively brieﬂy on the authors’ model
and more extensively on the empirical evidence. I conclude that the model
is not especially appropriate for studying this issue and that the empirical
evidence is not robust.
THE MODEL. What models have been used in the literature to study the
pros and cons of CBI? The ﬁrst was the model of time inconsistency and
inﬂation bias developed by Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott and later
extended by Robert Barro and David Gordon.
1 The source of inﬂation in
all these models is an interplay between wage setting behavior and the
incentive of the central bank to “surprise” the economy with an inﬂation
shock to reduce unemployment. Kenneth Rogoff pointed out how an
inﬂation-averse and independent central banker can improve on the trade-
off between rules and discretion.
2
A second approach emphasizes the political inﬂuences on monetary
policy, in particular, political business cycles, both “opportunistic” and
“partisan.” CBI can limit the inefﬁcient ﬂuctuations of inﬂation created by
1. Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott, “Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Incon-
sistency of Optimal Plans,” Journal of Political Economy 85, no. 3 (1977): 473–91; Robert
Barro and David Gordon, “Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Pol-
icy,” Journal of Monetary Economics 12, no. 1 (1983): 101–21.
2. Kenneth Rogoff, “The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary
Target,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 100, no. 4 (1985): 1169–89.
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political cycles. In this model the source of inﬂation is monetary policy
that is excessively loose because of political inﬂuences. Alesina, Gerald
Cohen, and Nouriel Roubini discuss this approach in detail.
3
The third type of model focuses on biases toward ﬁscal deﬁcit and the
pressure on central banks to accommodate such deﬁcits.4 In this context
CBI is part of a package that ensures ﬁscal responsibility and avoids all
excessive use of the inﬂation tax. Fiscal deﬁcits are the source of inﬂation
in this model.
The model of this paper is quite different. There is a lobby pushing for
inﬂation, but the general public is against inﬂation. Not much is said in the
paper about which lobby that would be in reality, nor does the paper
explain why the lobby beneﬁts from inﬂation. This is a good model for
other issues, such as trade protection or regulation of certain sectors. And
in fact, similar models have been widely used to discuss how policies that
are inefﬁcient for society as a whole are adopted to favor a speciﬁc, nar-
rowly deﬁned constituency. But this is not a good model for explaining
why countries ﬁnd themselves in a high-inﬂation equilibrium. Inﬂation is
almost universally the result of some form of macroeconomic imbalance,
not the effect of a small organized lobby pushing for it. The implications in
terms of which governments are more likely to be successful and which
will undertake reforms are different. The authors mention in passing that
the model is meant to be illustrative, but I am not at all sure how their
empirical implications would generalize to a more aggregate model of
inﬂation along the lines sketched above.
An additional issue concerns the endogeneity of central bank reform.
Many authors share the same problem that this paper has,5 namely, the
assumption that central bank laws are considered an exogenous variable,
an issue ﬁrst raised by Adam Posen.6 However, I feel that this shortcoming
is especially serious for this paper. In fact, it discusses interactions
between political regimes and central bank reforms and the role of lobbies
in pushing for more or less inﬂationary policies. The same political vari-
3. Alberto Alesina, Gerald Cohen, and Nouriel Roubini, Political Cycles and the Macro-
economy (MIT Press, November 1997).
4. For an extended discussion, see Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, Political Eco-
nomics: Explaining Economic Policy (MIT Press, 2002).
5. For example, Alberto Alesina and Lawrence Summers, “Central Bank Independence
and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence,” Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking 25 (May 1993): 151–62.
6. Adam Posen, “Declarations Are Not Enough: Financial Sector Sources of Central
Bank Independence,” NBER Macroeconomic Annual 10 (1995): 253–74.
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ables that make it more or less likely that a central bank reform will be suc-
cessful are at the root of the question of whether central bank reform is
adopted in the ﬁrst place.
THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE. Here I will focus on some sensitivity analy-
sis of the paper’s two key tables, table 2 and table 4.
7 First of all, the results
as presented in the paper are not especially strong. The theory has implica-
tions for the differences between coefﬁcients for three groups of countries
deﬁned in terms of the strength of executive constraints. In many cases, as
the authors acknowledge, these coefﬁcients, although different from zero,
are not statistically different from each other.
My ﬁrst sensitivity test examined to what extent the results were driven
by the Latin American countries, since this is a region that has experienced
much inﬂation and several central bank reforms. I found that, in table 2,
dropping Argentina makes all the relevant coefﬁcients insigniﬁcant in the
full sample; similar patterns hold for table 4. The results are thus very sen-
sitive to dropping one country.
Then I examined the groupings. The authors deﬁne their country groups
as follows: the intermediate group includes all the countries within one
standard deviation of the mean of their constraints index, and the strong
and weak groups include those more than one standard deviation above
and below the mean, respectively. The problem is that the distribution of
countries is very asymmetric: 36.5 percent of the countries are bunched at
the top of the distribution, with an index value of seven. Thus, the authors’
distribution is as follows:
—strong constraints (index of 7): 36.5 percent of the countries
—intermediate constraints (index between 3.92 and 6.99): 48 percent 
—weak constraints (index between 0 and 3.2): 15.5 percent (that is, a
handful of countries).
The results hold only if the weak-constraints group is restricted to a very
small set of countries. I tried two alternative groupings that seem more
reasonable:
8
—strong constraints: 36.5 percent 
—weak constraints: 36.5 percent 
—intermediate constraints: the rest,
7. I thank the authors for providing their data and codes, which made it very easy to
replicate and examine their results.
8. Note that, because of the bunching at the top, one cannot quite split the sample evenly
into thirds.
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and
—strong constraints: 36.5 percent 
—intermediate and weak constraints: split 50-50 between the remaining
countries.
With either grouping, the results of the paper disappear: the weak-
constraints group has a negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient, and the middle
group has an insigniﬁcant and often positive coefﬁcient. Thus even mov-
ing a handful of countries from the middle group to the weak group
changes the results. Therefore the strategy of looking at the interaction of a
quadratic function of the executive constraint variable with the CBI vari-
able does not guarantee robustness to the grouping classiﬁcation, contrary
to the authors’ claims.
9
In conclusion, investigating the success of policy reforms in alternative
institutional settings is a very good idea, but the paper does not use the
most appropriate model to address the issue at hand, and thus it derives
implications that may not be plausible. Moreover, the empirical evidence
is not robust.
COMMENT BY
DAVID ROMER The thesis of this paper by Daron Acemoglu, Simon
Johnson, Pablo Querubín, and James Robinson is simple but important.
There has been a vast amount of work on the political economy of poor
policies. Yet when it comes to thinking about the effects of policy reform,
economists and policymakers too often still adopt the perspective of a
benevolent social planner and assume that reforms will be implemented as
intended. The basic insight of the paper is that in thinking about the effects
of reform, it is a ﬁrst-order mistake to overlook the forces that gave rise to
the need for reform in the ﬁrst place. Considering those forces can criti-
cally change what one should expect. Often the change is particularly
stark: if a country is following poor policies because the rule of law is not
respected, reforms that consist of passing new laws are unlikely to change
anything at all. These core ideas more than repay the effort of reading the
paper.
THE THEORY. The authors develop their thesis both theoretically and
empirically, focusing on how central bank independence affects inﬂation.
9. The results of all these sensitivity tests are available from the author upon request.
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unlikely to reduce inﬂation much either in countries with unconstrained
leaders (because the reform will be ineffective) or in countries with highly
constrained leaders (because inﬂation will already be low). The largest
effect is likely to occur in countries with moderate levels of constraints on
their leaders. 
I have three main comments about the theory. First, it appears that noth-
ing critical hinges on the paper’s assumption that excessive inﬂation is the
result of special-interest lobbying. For example, suppose inﬂation arises
instead from dynamic inconsistency or the political business cycle. Central
bank reform would be unlikely to reduce inﬂation if power in fact
remained in the hands of politicians, but would be likely to do so if the
reform genuinely put control of monetary policy in the hands of an inde-
pendent central bank. The same is true if—to mention my favorite theory
of high inﬂation—inﬂation occurs because politicians understand the
short-run beneﬁts of demand stimulus but not the costs of inﬂation or the
difﬁculty of bringing it down. The fact that the theoretical results do not
rest on a speciﬁc view of the source of excessive inﬂation has the advan-
tage that the theory is not tied to the debatable view that inﬂation is the
result of redistributive efforts. But it has the disadvantage of reducing the
ability of tests based on the theory to discriminate among competing views
of the reasons for poor policies.
Second, the prediction of an inverted U-shaped relationship between
constraints on politicians and the effects of central bank reform on inﬂation
seems unlikely to be robust. There are two competing effects. On the one
hand, when constraints on politicians are weaker, the prereform situation is
worse, so the room for improvement is greater. On the other, when con-
straints are stronger, the extent to which nominal reforms are likely to have
force is greater. This suggests that the overall effect can go either way, but
it does not suggest a strong reason for expecting an inverted U-shaped rela-
tionship in particular. It is not difﬁcult to ﬁnd changes in functional forms
or other assumptions of the model that alter the prediction of an inverted
U-shaped relationship. To give a simple example, just dropping the
assumption in the paper’s model that inﬂation cannot be negative changes
the relationship from an inverted U to monotonically increasing.
Third, a prediction that is likely to be more robust is that if one controls
for initial inﬂation, the amount that central bank reform reduces inﬂation
will be monotonically increasing in the strength of political constraints.
Controlling for initial inﬂation eliminates one of the two competing
effects, and so leaves only the fact that nominal reforms are likely to have
more force when politicians are more constrained.
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sons. First, the prereform level of inﬂation is completely determined by the
extent of constraints, so once one controls for initial inﬂation there is no
remaining variation in political constraints. Second, the model’s assump-
tion that inﬂation cannot be negative means that inﬂation is sometimes at a
corner solution. This is important to the model’s implications, but it seems
quite unrealistic and complicates the analysis.
I therefore consider a modest variation on the paper’s model. First, I
replace the paper’s social welfare function with a conventional quadratic
one,
where I have normalized the socially optimal level of inﬂation to zero.
Second, I assume that the lobbyists’ preferred inﬂation rate (or, more gen-
erally, the inﬂation rate that would prevail in the absence of constraints on
politicians) varies across countries. Speciﬁcally, I assume that in the lob-
byists’ utility function, (the paper’s equation 3), 
α may be heterogeneous. And third, I model central bank reform as an
increase in the social cost of departures of inﬂation from its optimal
level—that is, as an increase in b. Thus, I interpret central bank reform as
an increased emphasis in the conventional (noncorrupted) policymaking
arena on reaching the optimal level of inﬂation. The rest of the model is the
same as the paper’s. The politician maximizes λu(π) + (1 – λ)t, where λ
measures the strength of constraints on politicians and t is the transfer from
the lobby, and the lobby makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the politician.
Analyzing the model along the lines of the paper yields an expression
for equilibrium inﬂation:
This expression has two implications. First, it shows that my variant of the
authors’ model captures their idea that reform does not affect inﬂation if
political constraints are either very low or very high. When λ is zero
(politicians are unconstrained), inﬂation equals lobbyists’ preferred level
of α/β regardless of how much weight is given to achieving low inﬂation
in the conventional policymaking process (b). And when λ is one (politi-
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inﬂation is zero for any level of b. More generally, equation 7′ implies the
inverted U-shaped relationship that the authors’ emphasize.
The second implication of equation 7′ is that
That is, at a given level of inﬂation, the amount by which inﬂation falls in
response to central bank reform is monotonically increasing in the strength
of political constraints. The intuition is exactly that described above: trying
to correct a bad outcome through some kind of nominal reform is more
effective when the rule of law is stronger.
THE EMPIRICAL WORK. Let me now turn to the empirical ﬁndings. One of
the most interesting aspects of the results is the absence of a strong correla-
tion between increases in central bank independence and decreases in inﬂa-
tion. This is most easily seen in the ﬁgures in appendix B, which are a
marvelous feature of the paper. Over the paper’s sample period, forty coun-
tries increased the independence of their central bank. But in thirty-four of
those countries, inﬂation relative to the world average either showed no
clear change from its behavior before the reform or, in a number of cases,
rose modestly but clearly. In only six countries was inﬂation following the
reform clearly lower than one would have expected based on its prior behav-
ior. This is hardly a stunning endorsement of the anti-inﬂationary power of
central bank independence.
One can also see from these ﬁgures why the authors obtain their result
about the relationship between political constraints and the behavior of
inﬂation following central bank reform. The six countries where inﬂation
clearly fell following reform are Argentina, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Peru,
Turkey, and Uruguay; all six are in the middle group in terms of political
constraints. Since only slightly more than half of the forty countries that
implemented reform are in this group, this pattern would be very unlikely
to occur by chance.
Looking at these correlations is interesting, and the ﬁnding that
increases in central bank independence are associated with falls in inﬂation
only in countries with intermediate levels of political constraints is intrigu-
ing. At the same time, I do not think one should get overly excited about
this result, for three reasons.
First, as the authors emphasize, in most speciﬁcations the effect is only
moderately statistically signiﬁcant.
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Second, there is considerable room for improvement on the authors’
measure of political constraints. The authors employ the average of the
Polity IV measure of constraints on the executive over their full sample
period, 1972–2004. This means that if a country reformed its central bank
in, say, 1992, the authors’ measure puts as much weight on political con-
straints twenty years before the reform, and ten years after the reform, as at
the time of the reform. If another country had its reform in 2002, the
paper’s measure for this country goes back thirty years rather than twenty.
I think it is clear that, conceptually, one would like to know how con-
strained politicians were at the time of the reform. The extent of constraints
at some point decades earlier or a decade later should not matter. What
should matter for whether reform puts genuine control over monetary pol-
icy in the hands of a legally independent central bank is whether the rule of
law is respected when the reform takes place. Because the Polity IV mea-
sure is not perfect, its lagged values surely convey some information about
current constraints given its current value. But this hardly makes a case for
the paper’s approach of treating each year identically.
Putting much more weight on the measure of constraints near the time
of the central bank reform changes one’s views of many of the reforms.
Consider the countries that the authors classify as having an intermediate
level of constraints. Four of these countries (Bolivia, Spain, Turkey, and
Uruguay) achieved the highest possible level of constraints a full decade
before their reforms and kept them at that level through the end of the sam-
ple, and four more (Ecuador, Greece, Mongolia, and Portugal) attained the
highest possible rating at least three years before their reforms and main-
tained it well afterward. In addition, Chile had an essentially unconstrained
executive for ﬁfteen years before its reform (although the constraints
jumped to the highest possible level in the year of the reform), and Peru
had a very low level of constraints from the year before its reform through
six years afterward. Thus, a more appropriate measure of the constraints
relevant to the effects of central bank reform would look quite different
from the authors’ measure.
1
1. The results based on an alternative measure of political constraints reported in table 3
of the paper are not reassuring in this regard, for two reasons. First, this measure also does
not systematically attempt to measure constraints around the times of central bank reforms.
Second, the results with this measure suggest that central bank reform reduces inﬂation by at
least as much under weak political constraints as under moderate constraints, which contra-
dicts one of the paper’s main hypotheses.
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inﬂation in response to changes in central bank independence, while the
model makes a rich set of predictions about the level of inﬂation and how
it responds to changes in both central bank independence and political con-
straints. For example, as I described, the model makes predictions about
the strength of political constraints and the fall in inﬂation following cen-
tral bank reform controlling for initial inﬂation. And it appears that at least
one of the model’s major predictions about those additional dimensions
fails. The model predicts that with weak political constraints, inﬂation will
be high both before and after central bank reform. But as the authors
mention, this is not what the data show: in the eight countries in the weak-
constraints group, inﬂation has been generally below the world average in
seven.
Thus, as with many other valuable papers, this paper’s contribution lies
more in raising issues than in resolving them. The paper does not come
close to settling the issue of how the political economy forces that give rise
to poor policies affect the consequences of policy reform. But it makes a
compelling case that those effects are likely to be large and important.
GENERAL DISCUSSION Gregory Mankiw wondered how best to
take political economy constraints into consideration when doing policy
analysis. If all outcomes are assumed to be the result of political con-
straints, analyzing the welfare implications of alternative policies becomes
a purely academic exercise. This paper seemed to propose a compromise:
sometimes policy can be altered to improve overall welfare, but other
times it is determined by politics. Mankiw was not sure how helpful this
perspective would be in practice.
Justin Wolfers suggested that some of the data used in the paper may be
unreliable. For example, the data from Zimbabwe indicate that the central
bank is independent, which, practically speaking, is probably not the case.
The lesson to draw from this paper may be not that central bank reform is
futile when political institutions are weak, but rather that central bank
reform is futile when institutions are weak and the reforms are not actually
being implemented. Conversely, some countries, such as Australia, have
de facto central bank independence before they formalize it in law, so the
formal policy change appears to have little effect. This should not lead one
to conclude that central bank independence is ineffectual in such countries,
however.
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the executive and the effect of policy reform on inﬂation. In countries with
strong constraints, changes in central bank law might simply be less corre-
lated with other important monetary policy changes. For example, the
paper cites as pertinent policy changes the 1999 Riksbank Law in Sweden
and the 1998 Bank of England Act in the United Kingdom. In fact, the
most important anti-inﬂationary policy changes in both countries probably
occurred in 1992, following the crisis in the European ﬁxed exchange rate
regime. Likewise, the 1998 Bank Act in the Netherlands is cited as an
important policy change, but probably the most important anti-inﬂationary
actions were those taken following the Maastricht Treaty at the beginning
of the 1990s. The paper does not list any major reform in the United States
during the sample period because there were no changes to the Federal
Reserve Act; however, there was an important change in the character
of U.S. monetary policy with the accession of Paul Volcker as Federal
Reserve chairman at the beginning of the 1980s.
Benjamin Friedman raised another issue that appears in the literature on
central bank independence, namely, the correlation between independence
and the country’s sacriﬁce ratio, a measure of the output cost of lowering
inﬂation. If central bank independence delivered lower inﬂation by anchor-
ing inﬂation expectations, this would imply that if some supply shock were
to cause inﬂation to increase unexpectedly, a country that has an indepen-
dent central bank should be able to return to low inﬂation at lower cost
than one that does not. However, it turns out that the correlation goes in the
other direction: countries with more independent central banks tend to
have worse sacriﬁce ratios. This casts doubt on the notion that the relation-
ship between central bank independence and low inﬂation is causal, and it
suggests that these phenomena may be jointly caused by some third vari-
able. Therefore Friedman proposed that the authors look at the relationship
between the variables they examine and the countries’ sacriﬁce ratios to
see what this implies about their model.
Edward Glaeser also recommended that the authors examine the inter-
action between central bank independence and other country-level vari-
ables. The observed correlation between central bank independence and
constraints on the executive may be caused by a third variable that jointly
determines both, such as GDP.
Gary Becker observed that shifts in political power often facilitate pol-
icy changes. Examining such power shifts, in addition to the legal reforms
studied in the paper, might be useful. Olivier Blanchard noted that the rea-
sons for central bank reform are important in inﬂuencing outcomes and are
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independence because of pressure from international organizations or from
other countries. Christopher Sims added that, in some instances, central
bank independence is simply a bad idea that economists have forced onto a
complicated and unfavorable political environment. Without the institu-
tions and ﬁscal policies necessary for an independent central bank to be
effective, central bank reform can become little more than an excuse for
the legislature to abdicate responsibility for inﬂation.
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